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Abstract
Explanations for cross-national divergence in attitudes towards pre-
cautionary regulation have largely neglected the potential influence
of legal traditions, notably the tension between precautionary tools
and the common law’s reactive approach. This is partially due to
the apparent clash between this thesis and the early emergence in
Britain of precautionary regulation under the 1863 Alkali Act.
Historical accounts of this development have focused entirely on do-
mestic factors, entrenching in the process an understanding of the
Alkali Act—and Britain more generally—as the origin of centralised
precautionary environmental regulation. In contrast, this article argues
that the Act was directly inspired by French and other continental
regulatory models, and that the regime it spawned constituted a
continental-common law hybrid. If the Alkali Act regime was partially
transplanted from the Continent, it becomes easier to reconcile the
civil law character of precautionary regulation with the evident pres-
ence of that instrument in Victorian Britain.
Keywords: Alkali Act, precautionary, legal transplants, technology
standards, legal traditions
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1. Introduction
Recent disagreements between the United States and the EU over precaution-
ary regulation closely parallel those that have for centuries split common law
from continental civil law-based approaches to health and safety regulation.
In legitimating regulatory interventions in the absence of scientific proof of
harm, the precautionary principle departs from the common law’s insistence,
most importantly within the framework of public nuisance litigation, that the
state carry the burden of proof on causation as a precondition for regulatory
intervention. Notwithstanding that, differences in legal tradition have general-
ly been left out of efforts to explain recurrent trans-Atlantic tensions over the
status of the precautionary principle.1
In similar fashion, common law ideology took a backseat to other explan-
ations when differences between the continental European and British ap-
proach to regulation became apparent soon after Britain joined the European
Community. The latter disagreement, revolved in large part over British resist-
ance to the German-led push for the implementation of uniform, technology-
based, pollution control standards.2
In Germany reliance on technology standards of this type was a core elem-
ent of the Vorsorgeprinzip, the emergent framework principle of German envir-
onmental policy during the 1970s. In the context of German air pollution
regulation, where the principle was first introduced, Vorsorge counseled a
policy of incremental reduction of emissions, by all sources, even in the
1 M Faure and N Vig, ‘Conclusion: The Necessary Dialogue’ in M Faure and N Vig (eds), Green
Giants? Environmental Policies of the United States and the European Union (The MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA 2004) 347; C Sunstein, ‘Precautions Against What? The Availability
Heuristic and Cross-Cultural Risk Perception’ (2005) 57 Ala L Rev 75; J Wiener and M
Rogers, ‘Comparing Precaution in the United States and Europe’ (2002) 5 J Risk Res 317; D
Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York 1986). Cf N Morag-Levine, Chasing the Wind:
Regulating Air Pollution in the Common Law State (Princeton University Press, New Jersey
2003).
2 Speaking directly to this controversy, a report published in Britain in1975 by the Department
of the Environment noted the recent emergence of significant difference between the ‘United
Kingdom and some of its partners’ over the deployment of ‘uniform emission standards.’ The
report attributed this tension to the incompatibility of such standards with the characteristic
British approach under which
. . . [i]t is important to concentrate on those areas where there is a need for control for
health reasons; and for the rest where effective control can be achieved at a cost propor-
tionate to the damage . . .Where the nature of the receiving medium and the local cli-
matic, social and industrial conditions are such that the natural environment can be
relied on to disperse and degrade the pollutant efficiently, then it makes sense to rely
on the environment to do the job of purification and disposal rather than take unneces-
sary remedial action.
Department of the Environment, Environment Standards: A Description of United Kingdom
Practice: The Report of an Interdepartmental Working Party (Pollution paper no 11, HMSO,
London 1977) 20.
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absence of conclusive evidence on cause-and-effect relationships between ex-
posure to particular pollutants and identifiable environmental harms.3 Rather
than conditioning regulatory interventions on scientific proof of the risks of
pollution, Vorsorge, generally translated as ‘precaution’, promoted the imple-
mentation of existing means of pollution reduction and the development of
cleaner industrial processes.4 When Germany sought during the 1980s to
make this principle a cornerstone of European environmental policy it met sig-
nificant British scepticism.
Accounts of this UK-German divergence placed little emphasis on differ-
ences in legal tradition and the tension between the proactive philosophy
underpinning the Vorsorgeprinzip and the common law’s reactive regulatory
principles. Instead, the leading explanation tied British resistance to
Germany’s technology-based approach to Britain’s geographic isolation and dis-
tinct weather patterns. In this vein, a leading environmental law treatise
offered the following: ‘[t]he main argument for the British position probably
stems from self-interest. With its rainy climate and fast-running streams,
ample coastline and relative remoteness, Britain can claim a comparative ad-
vantage when it comes to pollution. Put very crudely, the same discharge is
supposed to cause less pollution in Britain than in other countries, because of
its lesser effect on the environment’.5 The parsimony of the argument from
climate and geography and its consistency with interest-based theories of
comparative politics lends this line of explanation a surface appeal. But its per-
suasiveness is undercut by the fact that there is little history to support the
notion that Britain enjoyed, by virtue of its geography, superior protection
against injury from pollution. Britain of the 19th and early 20th centuries
was notorious for its smog, noxious vapours from copper smelting, alkali and
other manufacturing and sewage-contaminated rivers. Moreover, anecdotal
comparisons drawn over a long period have tended to describe environmental
conditions in Britain as inferior to those of the Continent, further detracting
from the capacity of climate and geography to explain cross-channel differ-
ences in regulatory approach.6 If the argument from geography nonetheless
3 A Weale and others, Environmental Governance in Europe: An Ever Closer Ecological Union?
(OUP, Oxford 2000) 67.
4 S Boehmer-Christiansen, ‘The Precautionary Principle in Germany-Enabling Government’ in
T O’Riordan and J Cameron (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Earthscan, London
1994) 31, 36^37.
5 S Ball and S Bell, Environmental Law: The Law and Policy Relating to the Protection of the
Environment (Blackstone Press, London 1995) 101. For similar weather and geography-based
explanations for the emergence of a distinct British approach to pollution see Vogel (n 1) 103;
R Wurzel, Environmental Policy-Making in Britain, Germany and the European Union
(Manchester University Press, New York 2002) 7; L Cass, ‘The Indispensable Awkward
Partner: The United Kingdom in European Climate Policy’ in P Harris (ed), Europe and Global
Climate Change (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham 2007) 66.
6 Already by the 1640s the superiority of atmospheric conditions in Paris relative to London is
said to have inspired the interest of Sir Kenelm Digby and John Evelyn (both Royalists who
escaped to Paris after Parliament assumed power) in air quality improvement. Noting that
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superseded common-law-based explanations, it is partially due to the long-
standing significance of technology standards in British environmental regula-
tion dating back to the Alkali Act of 1863.7 Parliament initially enacted the
Alkali Act in response to widespread injury from hydrochloric acid from
alkali manufacturers, injury that existing common law institutions seemed to
tolerate notwithstanding the availability of feasible means of mitigation.
Through various iterations over the next century, the Act expanded its jurisdic-
tion to numerous industrial processes and air pollutants. The principle under-
pinning the Act’s enforcement regime throughout the 19th and 20th
centuries (as well as additional British environmental legislation that followed
in its step) was a duty on the part of industrial sources ‘to use the best practic-
able means for preventing the emission into the atmosphere from the premises
of noxious or offensive substances’.8 As Nigel Haigh, the founder and longtime
director of the Institute of European Environmental Policy has written: to the
extent that the precautionary principle, in keeping with the early German per-
spective, is equated with the setting of achievable technology standards, the
Alkali Act could be said to have introduced the precautionary principle into
Britain.9 Regarding the question of whether the Alkali Act is better seen as an
example of the ‘precautionary principle’, which entails uncertainty, or the ‘prin-
ciple of prevention’ that assumes a proactive response to a known harm,
Haigh pointed to the fact that ‘uncertainty about when uncertainty disappears’
makes the distinction between the principles difficult to implement. The am-
biguous boundary between precaution and prevention is especially
well-illustrated through the mix of concerns to which the Alkali Act provided
a response.Widespread injury to property from the noxious vapours in ques-
tion offered clear-cut justification for preventive intervention, but worry over
the potential, though unproven, health effects was an important impetus as
well.10 Preventive regulation was the more common term at the time, though
references to precaution can likewise be found. It appears that within this
19th century context the concepts were largely interchangeable.11
‘[t]he air of London was worse than that of Paris or Lie' ge’ Digby advised ‘people with weak
lungs and plenty of money’ to live on the Continent. P Brimblecombe, The Big Smoke: A
History of Air Pollution in London Since Medieval Times 46 (Methuen, London 1987). Similar
sentiments were expressed in an 1853 article in a medical newsletter which declared ‘[w]e
do not despair of seeing London freed [from smoke], its inhabitants breathing as pure and
clear an air as those of Paris, Berlin, or Vienna.’ ‘The Smoke Nuisance’ The Medical Times and
Gazette, A Journal of Medical Science (Jul 2 - Dec 311853), 196, 197.
7 Alkali Act 1863 (26 & 27 Vict c 124).
8 M Hill, ‘The Role of the British Alkali and Clean Air Inspectorates in Air Pollution Control’
(1982) 11 Poly Stud J 165.
9 N Haigh, ‘The Introduction of the Precautionary Principle into the UK’ in T O’Riordan and J
Cameron (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Earthscan, London 1994) 241.
10 R MacLeod, ‘The Alkali Acts Administration, 1863-84: The Emergence of the Civil Scientists’
(1965) 9 Victorian Stud 85, 87, 102.
11 For examples of the use of the term ‘precautionary’ as a synonym for ‘preventive’ see text ac-
companying nn 40 and 56.
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Importantly, the various extant historical accounts have treated the intro-
duction of the Best Practicable Means (BPM) principle under the Alkali Act as
an indigenous British development.12 This reading of the history of the Alkali
Act regime has eroded the explanatory power of legal traditions where the ori-
gins of cross-national differences in environmental regulatory instruments
are concerned. This is because, if, as the prevailing account suggests,
common law Britain was an early and leading adopter of precautionary tech-
nology standards, the evidence appears to cut against any underlying connec-
tion between technology standards and the regulatory sensibilities associated
with the civil law tradition. Conversely, if, as this article will argue, the Alkali
Act regime was in fact inspired and modelled after preexisting continental ex-
amples, the early presence of technology standards in Britain is not inconsist-
ent with the understanding of precautionary regulation as an essentially
continental approach.
The place of continental influences in the Alkali Act’s passage and imple-
mentation was not central to the concerns of the historians who were first to
study the Alkali Act’s history and to whose efforts we are indebted for our
understanding of the Act’s watershed significance in the annals of environ-
mental history.13 In explaining the emergence of the Alkali Act regime, these
accounts have tended to highlight domestic political forces such as the power
of injured landowners who’d grown frustrated with nuisance law’s failure to
mitigate the pollution. The impression left as a consequence was that the
Alkali Act was born in England in isolation, and perhaps even in advance, of
any parallel initiatives on the Continent.14 In actuality, however, references to
continental pollution control practices are replete in the historical record sur-
rounding the Act’s initial passage and subsequent implementation, including
various parliamentary reports and debates. This evidence offers strong support
for the conclusion that the Alkali Act’s precautionary, technology-based, ap-
proach was consciously patterned after preexisting continental practices, even
12 MacLeod (n 10); E Ashby and M Anderson, The Politics of Clean Air (Clarendon Press, Oxford
1981); A Dingle, ‘The Monster Nuisance of All: Landowners, Alkali Manufacturers, and Air
Pollution, 1824^64’(1982) 35 Econ Hist Rev 529; B Pontin, ‘Integrated Pollution Control in
Victorian Britain: Rethinking Progress within the History of Environmental Law’ (2007) 19
JEL 173.
13 Ibid.
14 The author of a recent treatise on EU Environmental law commented on the tendency of some
British authors to describe the Alkali Inspectorate as ‘the world’s first national pollution con-
trol agency’ while disregarding the ‘older French and Prussian regime.’ E Bohne,The Quest for
Environmental Regulatory Integration in the European Union (Kluwer Law International,
Alphen aan den Rijn 2006) 102 fn 2. For some such references to the Alkali Inspectorate as
the ‘world’s first national pollution control agency’ see S Bell and D McGillivray,
Environmental Law (6th edn OUP, Oxford 2006) 22; Weale and others (n 3) 151; National
Center for Environmental Innovation, An In-depth Look at the United Kingdom Integrated
Permitting System (US Environmental Protection Agency, National Center for Environmental
Innovation,Washington DC 2008) 7.
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as these were adapted to British political sensibilities in the course of this
transplantation process.
The existence of systematic differences between British and continental
approaches to pollution was commented upon by mid-19th century observers
across both sides of the Channel. To these observers, in contrast with the
20th century writings discussed above, the respective influence of common
law and civil law principles stood as the evident explanation for the divergence
between British and continental pollution control practices. Most importantly,
these differences were said to revolve around the choice between proactive
and reactive modes of intervention. The continental paradigm imposed pro-
active controls on the location of polluting industries and the processes they
employed through administrative licensing and enforcement mechanisms. In
Britain, in contrast, industrial sources faced no a priori requirements as to
proper location or necessary controls. Within this reactive regime, regulatory
interventions were contingent on the presence and success of private and
public nuisance lawsuits.15 The evident deficiencies of this common law
regime encouraged, during the 1850s and early 1860s, a variety of initiatives
geared at the introduction of continental pollution control practices into
Britain, as the article will discuss.
The constitutionality of continental regulatory practices was a matter of
sharp controversy in Britain during the mid-19th century. Central to this con-
troversy was the movement for sanitary reforms, best associated, perhaps,
with the name of Edwin Chadwick, and the Public Health Act of 1848.16
These reforms, as discussed below, encountered strong resistance in the shape
of an anti-centralisation movement which denounced the era’s sanitary re-
forms as illegitimate deviations from traditional common law institutions and
principles. If the Alkali Act regime was largely spared this fight it was likely be-
cause its architects and implementers, determined not to repeat Chadwick’s
mistakes, were careful to distance their project from direct association with
the Continent and adapted it in a fashion that ultimately yielded the earlier
discussed BPM principle. In muting the contrast between Britain and the
Continent this transplantation process also diverted attention away from the
common law’s influence where the cause of remaining differences between
British and continental regulatory principles was concerned.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: Part 2 traces the historical
origins of the British and continental approaches, the contribution of differ-
ences in legal tradition to their divergences, and, in particular, the role of
common law ideology within the political opposition to continental-inspired
regulatory reforms in the decade and a half leading to the Alkali Act of 1863.
15 See discussion below text accompanying nn 31^40.
16 Public Health Act 1848, (11 & 12 Vict c 63).
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Part 3 follows the evolution of the Alkali Act regime from the 1862
Parliamentary Select Committee hearings that led to the Act’s passage up to
the 1884 death of Angus Smith, the first Chief Inspector of the Alkali
Inspectorate. Throughout this period, the discussion focuses on the role of con-
tinental models in the debates surrounding the Act’s initial passage, amend-
ments and implementation and the convergence of continental and common
law influences under BPM. In conclusion, the article comments briefly on the
continuing salience of this historical tension in contemporary international
divisions over precautionary regulatory instruments.
2. Legal Traditions and the Origins of the Continental
and British Approaches to Environmental Regulation
The legislative process that would result in the passage of the Alkali Act of 1863
was begun by Lord Derby a year earlier in a speech in which he called on the
House of Lords to appoint a select committee on the problem of noxious va-
pours.17 In his hands, offering what is perhaps the most direct piece of evi-
dence linking the origins of the Alkali Act with French influences, he held a
report entitled The Laws and Ordonnances in Force in France for the Regulation
of Noxious Trades and Occupations. Careful to insist that he ‘was not going to
ask their Lordships to imitate the principles or practice of the French law,
the provisions of which were very stringent in such cases’ Lord Derby nonethe-
less went on to quote a lengthy paragraph detailing the authorisation of poten-
tially noxious industrial processes under French law.18 The report from which
Lord Derby quoted had been presented to both houses of Parliament in 1855
and was commissioned by then Home Secretary Viscount Palmerston.19
Implicit to that report’s conclusion was a recommendation that England adopt
regulatory institutions similar to the French‘system of keeping an active super-
vision by means of a department of the Police (Hygie' ne Publique et Salubrite¤ )
over the noxious trades and occupations likely to interfere with the public
health’.20
A treatise on the regulation of noxious trades, published in Brussels in 1857
and written by the Chief of the Belgian Interior Ministry, Jules Vilain, likewise
highlighted the contrast between the principles that governed the regulation
of the offensive impacts of such trades in England, and those that applied on
17 Hansard HL vol 166 cols 1461^62 (9 May 1862).
18 Ibid.
19 DrWA Lewis, Report of the Laws and Ordinances in Force in France, for the Regulation of Noxious
Trades and Occupations (HMSO, London 1855).
20 Ibid 504.
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the Continent. Vilain summed up the pertinent difference in the following
terms:
On the continent the system adopted has been preventive with the guard-
ianship of the administration. The administrative authority is fortified
with preventive power, and the right of refusing permission to the exist-
ence of establishments dangerous, unwholesome, or inconvenient. The
English on the contrary, have adopted the repressive system. To let alone
that which is well, to prevent by penal laws that which is bad by the
action of the courts of law, is amongst the English the national rules,
and that of the public authorities. To respect liberty in all working estab-
lishments, to repress amongst them all offensive acts such is the principle
of the common law and the instinctive tendency very generally of the
country.21
As this quotation suggests, at the middle of the 19th century, British and con-
tinental regulatory practices were understood to diverge in a fundamental re-
spect. On the Continent, industrial facilities could operate only with the
permission and license of the pertinent authorities. Licensing served as a tool
through which the location and manner of operation of potentially offensive
trades could be controlled in advance. In Britain, industrial operators were
not required to obtain a licence in advance, and could choose their location
and mode of operation as they saw fit. To the extent that their activities in-
flicted harm on their surroundings they faced the risk of lawsuits that could
in principle result in the payment of damages or injunctions requiring that
they move elsewhere or mitigate their pollution. But, in contrast with the ‘pre-
ventive power’ present on the Continent, in Britain, regulatory interventions
were by necessity post hoc and dependent on proof of injury before a court.
This reactive feature was what set British regulatory institutions apart.
To mid-19th century observers such as Vilain, the role of the common law
tradition in forging these differences was evident, in contrast to the marginal-
ity accorded to legal traditions within the context of contemporary compari-
sons. If the common law’s salience has in time receded from view, this is likely
due to the later success of regulatory reform efforts aimed at adopting a more
preventive, or precautionary, approach along the continental model. Before
turning in Part 3 to the manner in which the Alkali Act came to blend contin-
ental with common law regulatory principles, the following sections focus on
the common law’s role in the creation and maintenance of the initial distinc-
tion between the British and continental approaches.
21 J Vilain, Traite' The¤ orique et Pratique de la Police des E¤ stablissements Dangereux Insalubres ou
Incommodes (A Theoretical and Practical Treatise on the Regulation of Dangerous,
Unhealthy, or Noisome Trades.) (E¤ mile Flatau, Brussels 1857) 496.
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2.1 Legal Traditions and the Division between Preventive and Reactive
Regulation
The law governing the regulation of noxious trades across much of continental
Europe during the mid-19th century was based on a Napoleonic decree origin-
ally issued in 1810, and subsequently confirmed and modified in 1815. The law
was motivated by two sets of concerns associated with noxious trades: worker
safety and neighbourhood impacts.22 The primary regulatory instrument it
relied on for this purpose was a requirement that the construction of listed
‘dangerous, unhealthy or noisome trades be authorised, following investigation
into the proposed project’s location, environmental impact and industrial
processes.23 The licensing requirement created a mechanism for directing
polluting industrial activity into separate zones, and away from residences
where possible. More important where the history of precautionary technology
standards is concerned, was the occasional imposition as part of these
pre-authorisation procedures of specific technology-based requirements for
pollution mitigation. This was the case in France where steam engines fitted
with smoke-consuming technology were put in a less stringent category than
engines that did not consume their smoke. In practice, this meant that oper-
ators of steam engines in cities faced the choice of either upgrading their pollu-
tion control techniques or moving out of town.24
The licensing procedures encoded under the 1810 decree were rooted in the
longstanding mercantilist practices of absolutist French monarchs, most direct-
ly the granting of monopolies and industrial privileges.25 The legal theory at
22 R Wolf, Der Stand der Technik: Geschichte, Strukturelemente und Funktion der Verrechtlichung
technischer Risiken am Beispiel des Immissionsschutzes (The State of Technology: History,
Structure and Function of the Legal Regulation of Technical Risks-the Example of
Immission Control) (Opladen,Westdeutscher Verlag 1986) 47.
23 The initial 1810 decree included 66 industries among those subject to a pre-authorisation re-
quirement; by 1846 the number increased to 307. I Mieck, ‘Luftverunreinigung und
Immissionsschutz in Frankreich und Preuen zur Zeit dur fruhen Industrialisierung’ (Air
Pollution and Immission Control in France and Prussia in the Early Industrial Age) (1981)
48 Technikgeschichte 239, 242. These were divided into three categories, in accordance with
their expected environmental impact. The most stringent requirements applied to facilities
categorised under class 1, which could only be established away from residences.
Manufacturers and workshops falling under the second class could under some circum-
stances and with proper surveillance be licensed in proximity to residences, whereas those
falling under the third category were generally deemed compatible with residential land
uses, though they too were subject to administrative surveillance.
24 Ibid 248.
25 In a study of the 18th century French roots of contemporary environmental regulation,
Reynard describes the mechanisms through which environmental concerns entered the pro-
cess surrounding requests for industrial privileges. These began with the role of expert evalu-
ation of the proposed operation and its impact, and continued with a public inquiry, which
served as a venue for voicing local concerns. Because industrial activity in France during
that time was for all intents and purposes dependent on the granting of a royal privilege,
the latter ‘amounted to an authorization procedure that often entailed a public inquiry into
the implications of the venture.’ PC Reynard, ‘Public Order and Privilege: Eighteenth-Century
French Roots of Environmental Regulation’ (2002) 43 Technol Cult 1, 26.
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the basis of French absolutism drew from Roman law principles of public law,
and attendant conceptions of the ruler’s prerogative authority to supersede pri-
vate rights where the common good demanded it.26 Based on this authority,
absolutist rulers across Europe argued for the right to intervene in economic
relations through unrestrained ordaining powers free of any other institution-
al constraint.27
In pursuing their own mercantilist policies, English monarchs similarly
invoked prerogative legislative authority. But their efforts were severely weak-
ened by the existence in England of a formidable alliance between Parliament
and common-law-trained legal professionals who challenged the constitution-
ality of absolutist, civil-law-based regulatory instruments. Particularly relevant
to the present discussion was the influential belief that royal monopolies and
privileges were contrary to common law principles of freedom of trade.28 The
victory of Parliament and the common lawyers after the Revolution of 1688
all but ended centralised regulation of industrial activity for at least a century
to come. At the very same moment that French absolutism reached its centra-
lising epoch under Louis the IIV, in England the ‘King and Parliament adopted
a policy of indifference as to what the various local governing authorities did
or abstained from doing’.29 Coupled with this localism, and further distinguish-
ing it from the Continent, was the relegation of enforcement procedures to re-
active judicial processes run by lay justices rather than a professional
bureaucracy of the French type.30
Thus it happened that instead of proactive limits on the location and pro-
cesses of industrial activity under a licensing regime, the regulation of noxious
trades in England of the 18th and early 19th century built on a core common
law principle allowing for regulatory intervention in the face of evident harm,
or nuisance. Coke justified this principle in reference to the Latin maxim ‘sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas’ (use your own without injuring another) in his
report of a landmark case involving the stench of a pigsty.31 Blackstone cited
26 G Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State, 1100^1322 (Princeton
University Press, New Jersey 1964) 343.
27 As Louis XV declared to the parliament of Paris: ‘It is from me alone that my courts derive
their existence and authority . . .and it is to me alone that supreme and undivided legislative
power belongs.’ B Pierce (tr), R Mousnier, The Institutions of France under the Absolute
Monarchy, 1598-1789, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1979) 669.
28 Particularly important to this development were a number of judicial decisions deeming
monopolistic restrictions on the freedom of the subject void under common law. M Shapiro
(tr), E Heckscher, Mercantilism (Allen & Unwin, London 1955) 282. Building on this doctrine,
Parliament prohibited the granting of most industrial monopolies under the 1623 Statute of
Monopolies, and again in 1640. J Nef, Industry and Government in France and England,
1540^1640 (Great Seal Books, Ithaca 1957) 362.
29 S Webb and B Webb, English Local Government: Statutory Authorities for Special Purposes
(Longsman, Green and Co, London 1922) 351.
30 HWArthurs,‘Without the Law’: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century
England (University of Toronto Press,Toronto 1985) 90^91.
31 Aldred’s Case (1611) 77 ER 816.
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the maxim to explain why ‘it is incumbent [on a neighboring owner] to find
some other place’, if the neighbour’s use of his land ‘causes injury to the land
of another’.32 In addition to private actions, violations of the sic utere principle
could result in criminal indictments where the pertinent injury qualified as a
common, or public, nuisance. As Blackstone explained: ‘[a]ll those kinds of
nuisances (such as offensive trades and manufactures) which when injurious
to a private man are actionable, are, when detrimental to the public, punish-
able by public prosecution, and subject to fine according to the quantity of
the misdemeanor: and particularly the keeping of hogs in a market town’.33
Public nuisances were indictable before lay justices of the peace in local
courts.34 Where found to constitute such a nuisance, noxious trades could be
subject to summaryabatement orders. A1757 decision concerning the manufac-
turer of sulphuric acid and other chemicals in the Parish of Tickenham attests
to the scope and potential reach of this authority. According to the indictment
in the case ‘the defendants erected 20 buildings for making noisome, stinking,
and offensive liquors; . . . [impregnating the air] with the noisome and offensive
stinks and smells; to the common nuisance of all the King’s liege subjects. . .’.35
Having been found guilty of the said nuisance, the defendants were ordered to
demolish the facility with the ‘materials, utensils and instruments, all sold or
parted with’.36 Abatement orders of this type became, however, increasingly
rare as industrialisation progressed. The reported cases for the century follow-
ing 1770 suggest that few air pollution nuisance cases reached the courts to
begin with, and that when they did, judges often sided with industry.37 This
was true not only with respect to lawsuits brought by individuals under private
nuisance doctrines, but also of criminal indictments in public nuisance.38
The result was widespread failure on the part of industrial sources to under-
take pollution control measures, even as these became available. The connec-
tion between the reactive principles of British regulation and inferior
pollution control practices in Britain, relative to the Continent was commented
upon by a senior French official whomVilain quoted in the treatise mentioned
above.39 In the absence of any licensing requirements of the type existing on
the Continent, that official explained, the door was open in Britain for:
. . . a manufacturer with great capital [to establish] himself in a poor
quarter where there is no fear of opposition. Abusing his position he
32 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (vol 2, 2nd edn Callahan and Company,
Chicago 1872) 217.
33 Ibid 168.
34 Webb andWebb (n 29) 351^52, 463.
35 Rex vWhite & Ward (1757) 97 ER 338.
36 Ibid.
37 JP McLaren,‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution ^ Some Lessons from Social History’
(1983) 3 OJLS 155, 159^60.
38 J F Brenner, ‘Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution’ (1974) 3 J Legal Stud 403, 421.
39 Vilain (n 21).
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takes none of these precautions which would have been imposed on him
in other countries, either to consume his smoke, disinfect his gas, or di-
minish the noise of the machinery. The result is that all the population
is exposed without protection to deleterious exhalations and inconveni-
ences of every kind.40
The British regime’s core deficiency, in the eyes of this observer, was not that it
allowed for massive amounts of pollution. Notwithstanding the existence of
preventive regulation, industrial pollution remained a serious concern on the
Continent as well.Where the British approach failed, instead, was in the imple-
mentation of incremental mitigation measures capable of reducing, albeit not
eliminating, environmental injuries.
This criticism was shared by those in Britain who sought to introduce into
British regulation a more preventive or precautionary orientation during the
mid-19th century. Thus the earlier mentioned 1855 report to Parliament
included multiple examples of the types of pollution mitigation various
French trades were required to undertake as a condition of their permits. As
that report related in France ‘[t]he Boards of Health only authorize manufac-
tories of Prussian blue [a synthetic pigment] on condition that all the flues
and chimneys of the boilers communicate with the chimney, 15 feet in height,
and that the water of manufactory shall not remain either in the culverts,
trenches, or public ways.’41 Elsewhere the same report referenced a require-
ment that brick manufacturers surround their furnaces with mattresses
stuffed with straw to protect surrounding properties from smoke,42 and that
elevated chimneys be constructed where mercury was used in the gilding of
metals.43 Commenting on the French industries he had had the occasion to ob-
serve, the report’s author, Dr Waller Lewis, noted that ‘[m]any of these are
models of what such manufactories should be’. And he went on to contrast
the ‘[n]ew and improved processes [that] have been introduced in these and
other factories’ with the ‘the old, objectionable, and unhealthy methods still
all but universally employed’ in Great Britain.44 By implication, Lewis attribu-
ted the inferior industrial processes in England to the absence of licensing pro-
visions of the type the 1810 Decree imposed on French businesses. In this,
England was set apart not only from France, but also from Belgium, the
Netherlands, Prussia and other continental countries where French
law spread at the start of the 19th century through Napoleon’s conquest and
influence, and where subsequent domestic legislation bore the imprint of the
40 Ibid 502.
41 Lewis (n 19) 52.
42 Ibid 91.
43 Ibid 93.
44 Ibid 504.
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original Napoleonic Decree.45 Attempts to bring British pollution and related
sanitary regulation in closer alliance with the preventive continental model
recurred in Britain for at least two centuries prior to the passage of the Alkali
Act of 1863. Throughout this history, those who sought to learn from continen-
tal administrative examples and considered the civil law a legitimate inspir-
ation collided with those for whom the common law’s reactive regulation was
a core constitutional principle, as discussed below.
2.2 Continental-Inspired Proposals for British Sanitary Reform
Efforts to bring polluting trades in Britain under preventive regulation pat-
terned after the continental model date at least as far back as the 17th century
writings of John Evelyn (1620^1706). A royalist sympathiser, Evelyn left
England for the Continent in 1643 where he stayed until 1652, most of this
time in Paris.46 Soon after the Restoration of the Monarchy in1660, Evelyn pre-
sented Charles II with a pamphlet titled Fumifugium: or the Inconvenience of
the Aer and Smoake of London Dissipated (1661).47 In it Evelyn described a
London engulfed in a ‘Hellish and dismal Cloud of SEA COAL’, which rendered
its inhabitants ‘obnoxious to a thousand inconveniences, corrupting the
Lungs, and disordering the entire habits of their Bodies’.48 Evelyn repeatedly
contrasted London’s poor air quality with that which he enjoyed in France,
and advocated a number of proposals drawing upon his observation of plan-
ning practices on the continent. Most importantly, Evelyn recommended that
trades causing manifest nuisances be placed ‘at farther distances; especially,
such as in their works and Fournaces use great quantities of
Sea-Coale . . .which so universally and so fatally infect the Aer, and would in
no City of Europe be permitted, where Men had either respect to health or
Ornament’.49 He then specifically identified brewers, dyers, soap and salt boil-
ers and lime burners as examples of the types of trades his proposal would
target for removal.50
More than a century later, the anonymous editor of a reprinted 1772 edition
of Fumifugium prefaced the work with an explanation of its continued and
even enhanced, relevance during his time.51 The industrial revolution had
45 Prussia, for instance, enacted in 1845 a General Trade Ordinance that required industries
with potential to pollute the air, such as tanneries, metal casters and gas works, to abide by
conditions to be specified in their permits.Wolf (n 22) 71; Vilain (n 21) 529.
46 çç, ‘Encyclopedia Britannica Online Entry for John Evelyn’ Britannica 5http://www
.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/197048/John-Evelyn4accessed 25 August 2010.
47 J Evelyn, Fumifugium: or,The Inconvenience of the Aer and Smoak of London Dissipated (B White
London, 1772).
48 Ibid 5.
49 Ibid 15.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid iii^vii.
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added new trades such as ‘Glass-houses, Foundries and Sugar bakers’ to the list
of noisome facilities that Evelyn recommended be removed from the city. But
the underlying problem remained the ‘absurd policy of allowing [noxious
trades such as] brewers, Dyers, Soap-boilers and Lime-burners to intermix
their noisome works amongst the dwelling-houses in the City and Suburbs’.52
Acknowledging that a ‘proposal of turning all the noxious Trades at once out
of town may be thought impracticable, as being inconsistent with the general
Liberty of the Subject’,53 the preface writer suggested a number of alternative
proposals compatible, in his opinion, with the enforcement powers of local
magistrates. These included both ‘proper indulgences’ for the operators of nox-
ious trades to build their facilities at sufficient distance from town so as to
give incentives for existing facilities to relocate, as well as a bar against the
construction of new polluting trades inside towns. A second line of recommen-
dations focused on the implementation of technological mitigation measures
ranging from higher and better constructed chimneys to concerted research
aimed at devising a ‘method for charring sea-coal, so as to divest it of its
smoke’.54
In advocating this ambitious smoke control agenda the author of the above
proposals accorded with the reformist spirit that swept into Britain from the
continent during the closing decades of the 18th century. On the continent
the 18th century brought a marked expansion in the state’s role in the mitiga-
tion of economic and social deprivations and an attendant growth in the
state’s regulatory authority and capacity.55 In pursuing these reform agendas,
continental rulers enacted detailed codes and entrusted their implementation
to an extensive bureaucratic apparatus. The term ‘police’ (a translation of the
German Polizei) came to serve in this context as a shorthand reference for the
totality of regulatory philosophy and institutions comprising this continental
approach. In Britain there were strong voices, most prominently that of
Jeremy Bentham, who promoted comprehensive reforms of British regulatory
institutions along the continental model. Reforms of this type entailed a shift
away from the traditionally reactive common law approach towards proactive
intervention. Terming reactive regulation ‘justice’ and preventive law ‘police’,
Bentham explained the difference in the following: ‘[j]ustice regards in particu-
lar offences already committed; her power does not display itself till after the
discovery of some act hostile to the security of the citizens. Police applies
itself to the prevention both of offences and calamities; its expedients are, not
punishments, but precautions; it foresees evils, and provides against wants’.56
52 Ibid iii.
53 Ibid iv.
54 Ibid v.
55 A Burns and J Innes (eds), ‘Introduction’ in Rethinking the Age of Reform: Britain 1780^1850
(CUP, Cambridge 2003) 11^12.
56 Jeremy Bentham,‘Chapter II. Sub-division of Offences’ in C Ogden (ed),TheTheory of Legislation
(K Paul,Trench,Trubner & Co Ltd, London 1931) 242.
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To Bentham the superiority of the continental model over a common law
system that, similarly to the methods used in the training of dogs, waited
until an offence took place to issue a rule, was clear and obvious.57 But his
reform proposals failed to make headway in Britain against trenchant oppos-
ition from judges, lawyers and other defenders of the common law.
By the start of the 19th century the reformist impulses in British politics
subsided considerably as those in Britain who’d long warned against the des-
potic tendencies of continental institutions pointed in vindication to the tyr-
anny unleashed in the wake of the French revolution.58 The Revolution and
the Napoleonic wars isolated Britain from the continent, spawned fear of the
dangers of tampering with existing political institutions, and set back the
agendas of British reformers.59 By the 1830s the moment was once again ripe
for political change, epitomised by the passage of the Reform Act of 1832.60
The sanitary crisis in the crowded and rapidly industrialising British cities
was among the problems Parliament was called upon to address.
Demands for government intervention in matters of sanitary policy drew on
a growing body of statistical evidence indicative of the interconnections be-
tween poverty, filth and disease.61 Viewed through this lens, sanitary reform
was justified as a public health measure and as such a legitimate sphere for
regulation even under principles of political economy and laissez-faire.
Growing attention to sanitary reform in Britain of the late 1830s and early
40s was also influenced by the example that a thriving French sanitary move-
ment provided at the time.62 The primary administrative units responsible for
the implementation of sanitary ‘police’ measures in France were various coun-
cils, or boards of health. These councils possessed both licensing and enforce-
ment authority in accordance with continental principles of administrative
law.Whether British sanitary policy should likewise be placed in the hands of
57 Regarding the analogy between the common law and ‘dog-law’, Bentham offered the
following:
Do you know how they make [the common law]? Just as a man makes laws for his dog.
When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait until he does it and
then beat him. This is the way you make law for your dog, and this is the way judges
make laws for you and me. They won’t tell a man beforehand. . . .The French have had
enough of this dog-law; they are turning it as fast as they can into statute law, that
everybody may have a rule to go by. . .
(J Bowring (ed) Jeremy Bentham,TheWorks of Jeremy Bentham (W Tait, Edinburgh 1843) 235).
58 Burns and Innes (n 55) 13.
59 Ibid 15.
60 M Brock, The Great Reform Act of 1832 and the Political Modernization of England (Hutchinson
Press, London 1973).
61 E Evans, The Forging of the Modern State: Early Industrial Britain, 1783^1870, (3rd edn
Longman, London 2001) 293.
62 WColeman, Death is a Social Disease: Public Health and Political Economy in Early Industrialized
France (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1982).
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a similar administrative apparatus was the politically volatile question at the
heart of early 19th century British sanitary debates.
The man who led the charge in favour of the continental approach was
Edwin Chadwick, a lawyer and close disciple of Bentham, who brought great
passion and energy, but limited political skills, to the mission of putting his
mentor’s legislative principles into practice. Most directly, Chadwick followed
Bentham’s footsteps in his departure from common law principles through the
pursuit of preventive legislative interventions.63 Like Bentham, Chadwick con-
sidered the French penal codes a model worthy of emulation.64 Chadwick was
likewise deeply influenced by the newly created judicial and administrative in-
stitutions in post-revolutionary France and, most importantly, the French pen-
chant for centralisation.65
In France, and through much of continental Europe, the creation of national
administrative institutions was seen as a prerequisite to the implementation
of social reforms in the decades leading up to and following the French
Revolution. The dependence of reform on centralisation was tied to the neces-
sity of overcoming opposition from local political interests and entrenched
legal privileges.66 British reformers of the time, epitomised by Bentham and
Chadwick, similarly equated reform with centralisation. Unlike on the
Continent, however, in Britain centralisation cut against what many con-
sidered a constitutional commitment to local government. As noted before, in
the wake of the 1688 Revolution the British Crown all but relinquished its au-
thority over local matters. In direct contrast with the growth of royal bureau-
cracies on the Continent, the locus of regulatory power in Britain up till the
start of the 19th century was in the hands of local justices of the peace.67
Traditionally drawn from the landed gentry, a growing number of these offi-
cials from the latter part of the 18th century onward were members of the
63 S Finer,The Life and Time of Sir Edwin Chadwick (Methuen, London 1952) 16.
64 Ibid 17.
65 Thus for example, in an article he published in the Chadwick London Review in 1829,
Chadwick offered the following on the French approach to poor relief, and the model it
might offer for reform of British law around that time:
We regret that the want of space prevents us giving any details of the system of adminis-
tration adopted in France for the relief of the poor, but we should fail in our duty, if we
did not earnestly recommend it as peculiarly deserving the notice of those who have
studied that momentous subject, -our poor laws.We must content ourselves with stating,
that the administrations of the funds raised for the relief of the poor are
centralized; . . .Great advantages have already been derived by centralizing the funds,
and the several establishments for the relief of the poor.
(‘A General Medical, and Statistical History of the Present Condition of Public Charity in
France’ in JB White (ed), 1:2 London Review (London 1829), 536, 561^562. Sir E Chadwick,
561^62.)
66 J Sperber, ‘Reforms, Movements for Reform, and Possibilities of Reform: Comparing Britain
and Continental Europe’ in A Burns and J Innes (eds) (n 55) 315.
67 Webb andWebb (n 29) 351.
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rising manufacturing and merchant class.68 ‘Unpaid and frequently preoccu-
pied with other matters, including some that must have raised doubts about
their impartiality, they often failed to demonstrate a sympathetic and con-
scientious attitude to their administrative responsibilities’.69 The result was a
pronounced lack of enforcement action against locally influential industrial
and other economic interests.70 For this reason, Chadwick argued, the time
had come for Britain as well to bring sanitary policy under national
supervision.
Chadwick promoted the cause of national sanitary reform in his enormous-
ly influential Report on the Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population of
Great Britain (1842).71 Recognition of the political necessity of diffusing the
tension between his foreign-inspired reform agenda and common law prin-
ciples led Chadwick to distance and distinguish his own proposals from contin-
ental ‘police’ institutions. Having consulted ‘every foreign source he could lay
hands on’72 Chadwick made a point of emphasising that despite the ‘striking’
success of public health measures instituted under the police model, most not-
ably in Germany, the model was ‘scarcely applicable to the substantive English
law, or to the early constitutional arrangements in which are found extensive
and useful provisions, and complete principles for the protection of the public
health’.73
In response to the raging and unresolved debate over the causes of disease
(and by implication the rationale for state intervention) Chadwick sought to
change the subject to practical engineering solutions to the evident filth and
stench of Victorian cities. ‘The medical controversy as to causes of fever’,
Chadwick wrote in his Report, ‘as to whether it is caused by filth and vitiated
atmosphere, or whether the state of the atmosphere is a predisposing cause to
the reception of the fever . . .does not appear to be one that for practical pur-
poses need be considered, except that its effect is prejudicial in diverting atten-
tion from the practical means of prevention’.74 The argument was in opposition
to a central premise of the reactive common law regime: the insistence on
proof of cause and effect relationships between a regulated behavior and
identifiable harm.Within this framework, scientific uncertainty on the causes
of disease was a significant barrier to the implementation of available pollution
control measures. The ability to circumvent this evidentiary impasse
accounted for the appeal of the continental approach to Chadwick and other
British sanitary reformers of the time.
68 Arthurs (n 30) 94.
69 Ibid 94.
70 Ibid 152.
71 Chadwick (n 65) 561^62.
72 Finer (n 63) 209.
73 Chadwick (n 65) 348.
74 Ibid 214 (emphasis added).
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A similar willingness to relinquish proof of injury to health in favour of a
focus on technical solutions characterised the work of a Parliamentary Select
Committee convened in 1843, under the chairmanship of WA Mackinnon, a
Scottish MP and a Chadwick ally, to inquire into the ‘Means and Expediency
of preventing the Nuisance and Smoke arising from Fires or Furnaces’. As evi-
dent from its title, the Committee’s primary concern was the ‘means and expe-
diency’ of smoke prevention and not the justification for preventing smoke in
the first place. Over16 hearings the Committee heard testimony from chemists,
engineers, manufacturers and proprietors of steam engines and various ‘in-
genious persons who had devised means and taken out Patents for the
Prevention of Smoke’.75 All were asked to focus their testimony on three inter-
related questions. The first pertained to practicability of available means for
preventing or diminishing smoke. The second applied to the advisability of
compelling manufacturers to adopt any such means. And the third examined
the political expediency of legislation geared at smoke abatement. Having con-
cluded from the evidence put before it that smoke could be feasibly controlled
through available technological means, the Committee concluded its report
with the recommendation that Parliament take up a bill prohibiting the pro-
duction of smoke from furnaces and steam-engines. When the government
balked at this recommendation, Mackinnon himself unsuccessfully presented
a bill along these lines in 1844.76 His efforts over the next five years yielded
six additional smoke bills, all of which were ultimately defeated.77 The failure
was in part attributable to the absence of clear proof that smoke injured
health.78 Mackinnon’s attempt to frame the debate in reference to the practic-
ability of control, rather than scientific proof of harm, proved insufficient to
the task.
A modest legislative step in the direction of technology-based control was
nonetheless taken under the Metropolitan Buildings Act of 1844,79 passed in
response to Chadwick’s report and a subsequent Royal Commission Report on
the Health of Towns. The Act prohibited the establishment of new offensive or
noxious businesses in London at a distance of less than 40 feet from any
public way, or less than 50 feet from dwellings. In tandem, the Act set a limit
of 30 years for the operation of existing noxious business at less than the dis-
tances specified. Importantly, however, where such businesses were able to
demonstrate deployment of ‘all the means then known to be available for miti-
gating’ their effects, Section 26 of the Act authorised justices to exercise leni-
75 Select Committee on Smoke Prevention, ‘Report from the Select Committee on Smoke
Prevention together with the minutes of evidence appendix and index’ HC (1843) 583.
76 Ashby and Anderson (n 12) 10.
77 Ibid 11.
78 Ibid 14.
79 Metropolitan Buildings Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict c 84).
18 Noga Morag-Levine
 at M
ichigan State U
niversity on A
ugust 13, 2012
http://jel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
ency, creating in this fashion a judicial, licensing-like, mechanism for the im-
plementation of available means of pollution control.
Four years later, in the Public Health Act of 1848,80 Parliament settled on an
‘uneasy compromise’ between proponents of centralised sanitary reform and
defenders of common-law-based local institutions.81 The Act provided a
code-like regulatory template for local sanitary governance, which included
provisions for the construction of sewers, drainage and water and gas supplies,
burial grounds and nuisance abatement. In what appeared like outright adop-
tion of continental licensing, the Act subjected the establishment of noxious
or offensive trades to the authorisation of local boards of health.82 This re-
quirement was coupled with authority on the part of the local board to enact
by-laws regulating the operation of such newly established noxious trades ‘in
order to prevent or diminish the noxious or injurious effects thereof’.83 Unlike
the situation on the Continent, where preventive sanitary regulation was
imposed as a matter of course, the provisions of the Public Health Act were to
be made applicable to any particular locality only in response to a petition
from one-tenth of its rate-paying inhabitants and a subsequent hearing of lo-
cally interested parties. The one exception where localities could be coerced
into the Act’s regulatory regime pertained to areas where the annual death
rate exceeded 23 per thousand.84
The Public Health Act fell short of Chadwick’s vision in the Sanitary Report
not only in that it left most localities free to choose whether to accept or
reject its terms, but also in its reluctance to rely on administrative bodies that
would directly challenge local interests. Thus, whereas Chadwick’s plan called
for placing local sanitary authority in the hand of crown-appointed boards,
the Act ultimately empowered elected municipal bodies for this purpose. In
similar fashion Chadwick’s recommendation that local boards be subject to
centralised legal, financial and engineering oversight via the supervision of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, was rejected in favour of endow-
ing a newly created central board of health with limited supervisory
authority.85
Other than the authority to impose the Act under the circumstances
described above, the central board exerted some control over the dismissal of
local surveyors, the approval of engineering projects and the capacity of local
boards to borrow money for the purpose of financing these projects.86 An art-
icle published in Britain shortly before the Public Health Act was signed into
80 Public Health Act 1848 (11 & 12 Vict c 63).
81 Evans (n 61) 364.
82 Public Health Act 1848 s LXIV (11 & 12 Vict c 63).
83 Ibid.
84 Public Health Act 1848 s VIII (11 & 12 Vict c 63).
85 R Lambert, Sir John Simon and English Social Administration (Macgibbon & Kee, London 1963)
65.
86 Finer (n 63) 319.
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law characterised the division of authority between central and local govern-
ment under the Act in the following way: ‘[i]n the actual administration of
the act, little or nothing is assigned to the Central Board. The power is almost
entirely in the hands of the Local Board . . .And as the local Boards are popu-
larly selected, the power of putting the act in force ultimately belongs to the
great body of inhabitants of the districts affected’.87 The same article then
went on to contrast British sanitary institutions, even subsequent to the
Public Health Act, with those that prevailed on the continent where the
‘power of enforcing measures for public health, is vested almost exclusively in
central or government boards’.88 Notably, the author attributed the observed
differences between British and continental sanitary regulation to a funda-
mental divergence in underlying conceptions of state authority:
A curious chapter in the history of the internal economy of states is that
which the various sanitary provisions adopted under different forms of
government, Nations working for the same end, the public health, seek
it by entirely different means. On the Continent, where the rights and lib-
erties of individuals seldom constitute a serious obstacle to State pur-
poses, the most stringent sanitary regulations have long existed and the
surveillance of police, which is almost unknown in England, constitutes
the principal means of effecting them. Here, the public jealousy of state
interference, and a sensitive regard for the rights of property, have long
prevented the institution of a general organized sanitary system.89
This divergence, as touched upon earlier, traced to the constitutional struggles
of the 17th century and the subsequent decentralisation of British economic
regulation. The legitimacy of civil-law modelled regulatory institutions such
as royal proclamations and conciliar courts such as the Court of Star
Chamber was the essential constitutional question in dispute during that era.
The claim that common law principles barred the introduction into England
of civil law instruments of this type dates at least as far as the 15th century
writings of Sir John Fortescue.90 The barrier followed for Fortescue from the
common law’s rejection of the absolutist authority which the Civil Law was
said to confer under the Justinian maxim ‘[w]hat please[s] the prince has the
force of law.’ 91 Sir Edward Coke and other leading common law theorists built
on this line of argument in their opposition to the ‘civilian’ Stuart monarchy.
The Revolution marked the ascendance of common law ideology and
87 ‘Sanitary Laws at Home and Abroad’ (1848) 11 Civ Eng Arch J 252, 253.
88 Ibid 253.
89 Ibid 252.
90 Sir John Fortescue, in S Lockwood (ed), In Praise of the Laws of England (CUP, Cambridge
1997) 17.
91 Ibid.
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seemingly confirmed the unconstitutionality of civil law-based regulatory in-
stitutions. Notwithstanding this, throughout the18th and early19th centuries,
reformers of various stripes sought to introduce continental modelled adminis-
trative initiatives, as discussed before. Advocates of these foreign-inspired pro-
jects, such as Bentham, were regularly charged with mounting ‘attacks
leveled against the very heart of the English constitution’.92 With added force
the same line of argument encountered, and ultimately helped derail, the
Public Health Act, as discussed below.
2.3 Anti-Centralisation and ‘Local Self-Government’
Among the Public Health Act’s most vocal opponents was a barrister by the
name of Joshua Toulmin Smith. A prolific and indefatigable crusader for ‘local
self-government’, Toulmin Smith set out to mobilise public opinion against the
encroachment of centralised continental regulatory institutions, which the
Public Health Act in his eyes epitomised. Toulmin Smith had no quarrel with
the importance and legitimacy of public health measures. But he insisted that
any such measures must be based on ‘[i]nstitutions of true Local Self-
Government’ that is, in accordance with common law.93 Where public health
protection was concerned, the pertinent and wholly sufficient regulatory insti-
tution was nuisance law. For Toulmin Smith the superiority of nuisance law
followed from the burden of proof it imposed upon those who sought protec-
tion against injury from others. In his words, the common law, ‘most whole-
somely throws it upon those who allege any particular thing or course of
proceeding to be inconsistent with the health of any neighbourhood, or its
welfare in any respect, to bring forward the proof, before the people them-
selves, that it is as alleged’.94 In this fashion, the common law ensured that
public health interventions will proceed only out of ‘true regard for public wel-
fare’ rather than ‘specious disguise’ aimed at gaining ‘some interested object’ or
‘crude individual notions’. What made this evidentiary requirement a corner-
stone of English constitutionalism for Toulmin Smith was the protection it
offered against ill-intentioned interferences with property and liberty under
specious health and safety justifications. In contrast, it was the ability to
bypass judicial scrutiny of this type that explained for Toulmin Smith ‘the
favour Centralization finds in the eyes of interested schemers’.95 The ‘so-called
‘Public Health Act’ of 1848’ wrote Toulmin Smith, had as its ‘object to reduce
all places into a state of abject subjection and subserviencey; to impose upon
them enormous and lasting burthens which shall completely tie up their
92 J Redlich, in FW Hirts (ed), Local Government in England (Macmillan & Co, London 1903) 145.
93 J Toulmin Smith, Local Self-Government and Centralization (Chapman, London 1851) 115.
94 Ibid 115.
95 Ibid 115.
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hands to fasten a horde of functionaries upon the land; and to loosen all the
foundations of Law and Property’.96
The connection between localism and self government followed for Toulmin
Smith from the intersection between two defining historical features of local
administration in England. The first was the reliance of traditional local insti-
tutions such as the Parish and the County, on unpaid, lay officials rather than
continentally inspired ‘Commissioners’ and ‘Inspectors’.97 The second was the
judicial, and hence reactive, procedures through which English local govern-
ment ruled. In this, English local government accorded with what Smith pos-
ited as ‘fundamental rule of the English constitution’: ‘[a]ll Law must spring
from the people and be administered by the people’.98 Centralisation, in con-
trast, served for Toulmin Smith as an umbrella under which he lumped the
various ills of continental administration, or in his preferred formulation ‘for-
eign centralized system of Police’.99 The central message Toulmin Smith ex-
pounded throughout his writings was that the continental model was not
only inferior to ‘local self-government’ but unconstitutional by virtue of its de-
viation from common law principles.
The influence of Toulmin Smith’s ideas is evident in the constitutional line
of arguments put forth in opposition to the Act in the parliamentary debates
leading up to the legislation. Thus for example, in May 1848 a Tory MP by the
name of David Urquhart denounced the Public Health Bill as ‘un-English and
unconstitutional^corrupt in its tendency^it was an avowal of a determination
to destroy local self-government, and, if carried, its effect would be to pass a
roller over England, destroying every vestige of local pre-eminence, and redu-
cing all to one dull and level monotony’. In what may well have been a direct
quotation from Toulmin Smith, Urquhart then went on to note that ‘anyone
who would take the trouble to refer to Blackstone’s Commentaries would find
that the common law provided ample means for putting down all the nuis-
ances to which this Bill referred. The Bill was in this respect useless; the
common law provided an ample remedy; and if the remedy provided by the
common law were not applied, it was solely owing to our own neglect’.100
The strong opposition which the Public Health Bill encountered in and out
of parliament forced a legislative compromise whereby the authority of the
general board of health was significantly weakened relative to the more rigor-
ous oversight powers that Chadwick’s plan intended to confer on the Board at
the start. A crucial concession made in this regard was the large amount of dis-
cretion the Act left local authorities both with respect to whether to accept
96 Ibid 207.
97 J Toulmin Smith, Government by Commissions: Illegal and Pernicious (S Sweet, London 1849)
295.
98 Toulmin Smith (n 93) 21.
99 Ibid 204.
100 Hansard HC vol 98 col 710^43 (5 May 1848).
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the Act’s jurisdiction in the first place and regarding its implementation subse-
quent to that. For its part the General Board possessed few enforcement
powers of its own.101 Moreover, once established, the Board proved reluctant
to invoke the limited coercive tools available to it under the Act, most import-
antly the authority to impose the Act on localities with high death rates.102
At the same time, to the degree that the Act invigorated local enforcement
against pollution sources and other public nuisances, the General Board
(which frequently upheld such local actions) became a lightning rod for criti-
cism from those whose economic interests were on the line.103 Chadwick’s au-
thoritarian personality and political insensitivity further added to the Board’s
unpopularity.104 Chadwick personally, and the Board of Health more generally,
were irrevocably associated in the process with ‘alien despotism’.105 By 1854,
Chadwick, together with the other two members of the Central Board, were
forced to resign, a moment that marked the end of Chadwick’s career in
public life. The person who would take his place as the leading public health re-
former and administrator was Dr John Simon.
Simonçwho would go on to occupy a series of senior positions in sanitary
administrationçwas appointed to the Central Board of Health in 1855. The ap-
pointment was due to the efforts of Sir Benjamin Hall, who assumed the presi-
dency of the Central Board in 1854.106 Hall was a vehement opponent of
Chadwick and a devotee of local government, whose appointment to the
Board was celebrated by the anti-centralisation movement.107 For Hall, the ab-
sence of a Medical Officer on the Central Board until then was indicative of
the undue weight that Chadwick and his allies ascribed to technical and en-
gineering capacity, rather than medical analysis of the causes of disease.108
The appointment of John Simon to the Board ushered in a transformation in
this respect.
Simon took from Chadwick’s political demise clear-cut lessons on the ideo-
logical barriers impeding direct transplantation of continental sanitary institu-
tions to Britain. Determined to avoid the taint of ‘centralisation’, Simon was
reluctant to impinge on local autonomy and sought to secure the cooperation
of localities through persuasion rather than coercive interventions.109 The
shift is a testament to the influence of ‘Local-Self Government’ ideology
during the 1850s. Evidence that for Simon this shift was at least partially the
101 U Henriques, Before the Welfare State: Social Administration in Early Industrial Britain
(Longman, London 1979) 138.
102 Ibid 140.
103 Ibid 144.
104 D Porter, Health, Civilization and the State: A History of Public Health from Ancient to Modern
Times (Routledge, London 1999) 126.
105 Lambert (n 85) 222.
106 Ibid 229.
107 Ibid 222^23.
108 Ibid 229.
109 Ibid 264.
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result of ideological conviction rather than strict political calculation, can be
found in retrospective discussion of this era in his book English Sanitary
Institutions.110 There Simon applauded the ‘new spirit’ which the Presidency of
Sir Benjamin Hall brought to the Central Board whose ‘tenure of of-
fice . . . tended importantly to bring into vogue the better conceptions which
had then begun to declare themselves, and which from then till now have
been of growing influence in this country, as to the proper limits of central au-
thority in relation to affairs of local government’.111 In a footnote he also
noted Toulmin Smith’s strong and learned constitutional argument against
‘[t]he former system’.112
The element that defined Simon’s approach to sanitary administration, and
distinguished him from Chadwick, was the foundational role he ascribed to
medical science within public health policy. As discussed, Chadwick was far
less interested in the exact causal link between filth and disease than he was
in the implementation of practical solutions to specific sanitary problems.
John Simon, in contrast, put scientific investigation at the heart of the sanitary
enterprise, beginning with the publication of his Papers Relating to the
Sanitary State of the People of England in 1858. The core of the Sanitary Papers
consisted of statistical mortality figures and the distribution of various diseases
across multiple locations in Britain, revealing in the process drastic fluctu-
ations, consistent with differences in residential and industrial conditions, in
rates of fatal diseases.113 Simon contributed an introduction in which he elabo-
rated on the lessons these findings suggested on the preventability of disease
and the proper administration of sanitary reform.114 However, in keeping with
the anti-centralisation sensibilities of the times, Simon professed his faith in
the capacity of scientific information to spur local authorities into voluntary
action. In contrast to the coercive functions Chadwick’s model envisioned for
central government, Simon viewed the provision of expert and impartial scien-
tific information on the causes of disease as the core sanitary task of central
government.115
The Sanitary Papers inaugurated a new era of ‘preventive medicine’ that suc-
cessfully diffused much of the antagonism that Chadwick’s ‘sanitary engineer-
ing’ earlier precipitated. The favourable reception could perhaps be
attributable in part to the fit between the emphasis on scientific inquiry and
the foundational common law principle conditioning regulatory interventions
on proof of harm. Chadwick deviated from this principle in his preoccupation
with technical solutions to evident stench and filth in advance of clear
110 Sir John Simon, English Sanitary Institutions: Reviewed in Their Course of Development and in
Some of Their Political and Social Relations (2nd edn John Murray, London 1897).
111 Ibid 237.
112 Ibid.
113 Lambert (n 85) 262.
114 Ibid 263.
115 Ibid 265.
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understanding of the mechanism through which these threatened health.
Consequently, the shift from sanitary engineering to preventive medicine
served, to some degree, to realign mid-19th century British sanitary policy
with common law principles. This point bears emphasis due to its potential
relevance for understanding the common law roots of the scientific orientation
that characterised the British approach to regulation at the end of the 20th
century.
Where the regulation of noxious fumes in the years leading up to the Alkali
Act is concerned, the attempt after 1854 to cast legislation in more ‘common
law friendly’ terms is best evident in The Nuisances Removal and Diseases
Prevention Act.116
The product of Sir Benjamin Hall’s single year as President of the Central
Board, the Nuisances Removal Act appears to have been geared at the imple-
mentation of available technological means for ameliorating sanitary health
hazards, and as such was consistent with Chadwick’s sanitary engineering ap-
proach. The Act adapted this model to the reactive logic and evidentiary de-
mands of the common law, however, by conditioning any such technology-
directed intervention on a two-step proof of injury. Under the Act, local autho-
rities could bring complaints before local justices of the peace, but only upon
certification by a medical officer, or two medical practitioners, that the condi-
tion in question constituted a nuisance, or injury to health. Next, the justices
were to inquire themselves into the allegations and were authorised to
impose fines on the owners of offending premises only to the extent that they
were themselves persuaded of the existence of such injury. The political senti-
ments behind this requirement were made clear in a treatise, first published
soon after the passage of the Act, whose writer noted with satisfaction
the Act’s insistence on proof of injury and contrasted it with earlier legislation
which, out of an over abundance of concern for public health, justified
‘enactments containing enormous arbitrary powers’.117 It was for the purpose
of preventing ‘the abuse of these powers’ that the same author went on to
note ‘that the checks provided by the statute now under discussion were
interposed’.118
Presented with the necessary proof, local justices were authorised under
the Act to impose fines ranging from five pounds for a first offence to 200
pounds maximum for repeated offences. But as the Act explained under sec-
tion 28 which dealt with effluvia from noxious trade, fines could be assessed
only against businesses that failed to deploy ‘the best practicable means for
abating such nuisances or preventing or counteracting such effluvia’.
Furthermore, under the latter circumstance, justices were authorised to
116 Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict c 121).
117 D Deady Keane, The Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Acts, with Introductory
Comments, Cases, and Forms (5th edn Shaw and Sons, London 1866) 9.
118 Ibid 9^10.
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suspend the fines ‘upon condition that the person so complained against shall
undertake to adopt, within a reasonable time, such means as the said justices
shall judge to be practicable and ordered to be carried into effect for abating
such nuisances, or mitigating or preventing the injurious effects of such efflu-
via’. The goal of the Act was, as such, to spur the implementation of available
sanitary improvement measures, much like the continental sanitary model
which Chadwick and others sought to import. But, whereas the continental
model (adopted with respect to noxious trades to some degree by the 1848
Public Health Act) relied on proactive licensing requirements, the Nuisances
Removal Act, in accordance with the common law’s reactive approach, stepped
in only once as an injury materialised.
In this respect the 1855 Nuisances Removal Act departed not only from the
Public Health Act, but from an Act requiring the abatement of smoke in the
London Metropolis which Parliament passed two years before.119 As noted ear-
lier,120 a Parliamentary Select Committee concluded in 1844 that the techno-
logical means needed to consume smoke were available and feasible, and
unsuccessfully recommended legislation that would have required operators
of furnaces to prevent emissions of smoke. A number of subsequent legislative
initiatives along these lines similarly failed, including an amendment by the
House of Lords that sought to include provisions dealing with smoke abate-
ment within the Public Health Act of 1848. The absence of clear evidence link-
ing exposure to smoke with injury to health was among the chief reasons
cited against the inclusion of a smoke abatement clause in the 1848 Act. The
perspective of supporters of smoke abatement since the McCormick commit-
tee’s 1844 report was that uncertainty on health effects should not impede the
implementation of available means. But this view was unable to overcome the
opposition of those in Parliament who held to the view that ‘[t]he only justifi-
cation for such a [smoke clause] was, that smoke had an effect on the public
health’. And that ‘[i]t ought not too hastily . . .be presumed that what were
called nuisances were necessarily injurious to health’.121
The Smoke Nuisance Abatement Act that Parliament finally passed in 1853
was restricted to the London Metropolis. Its passage is credited to the efforts
of Lord Palmerston, who during his less than three years as Home Secretary
(1852^1855), added smoke abatement to the list of social reform causes to
which he lent his energy.122 The operative clause in Palmerston’s smoke law
required that smoke from industrial furnaces ‘be constructed or altered so as
to consume or burn the smoke’. The law threatened operators of smoky fur-
naces with fines that were to increase with subsequent offences and delegated
enforcement authority to metropolitan police commissioners who were to
119 The Smoke Nuisance Abatement (Metropolis) Act 1853 (16 & 17 Vict c 128).
120 See nn 72^73 above and accompanying text.
121 Hansard HC vol 100 cols 1173^80, 1179 (7 August 1848).
122 D Roberts ‘Lord Palmerston at the Home Office’ (1958) 21 Historian 63, 65.
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bring violators before the courts. Determined to see that the Act would not
become a dead letter, Palmerston actively prompted the police into action and
had the Crown counsel press for maximum fines.123 Notably, the demand for
smoke abatement, under Palmerston’s law, was independent of proof of injury
to health or even an annoyance and, as such, closer in spirit to the continental
approach.
Lord Palmerston’s evident plans for future legislative initiatives along this
line prompted his request for the earlier discussed Lewis Report on French
regulation of noxious trades.124 By the time Dr Waller Lewis completed his
report in 1855, Palmerston had left the Home Office to become Prime Minister.
Instead, it was Lord Derby, the once and future conservative Prime Minister,
who would end up citing from Lewis’s Report while calling for Parliamentary
investigation into pollution from Alkali manufacturing. Lord Derby justified
his call for legislative intervention through three arguments. The first was the
scope of property and other damage which the ‘poisonous gases’ inflicted on
surrounding lands. The second was the evidentiary obstacles that the
common law placed before plaintiffs who looked to it for relief. And the third,
and arguably most important, was the availability of what he described as ‘a
most perfect and complete remedy’ at least where the problem of Alkali pollu-
tion was concerned, as will be seen below. Lord Derby credited those manufac-
turers who already made use of this technology with excellent results, but
noted with regret that others failed to take ‘the same precautions’due to the dif-
ficulties associated with bringing successful actions under common law.125
3. Forging a Hybrid British Approach: The Alkali Act
(1863^1884)
Within seven days of Lord Derby’s speech, a House of Lords Select Committee
on Injury from Noxious Vapours was appointed and began hearing
witnesses.126
3.1 From the House of Lords Select Committee to the Alkali Act
The Select Committee hearings concerned a long list of industrial processes
and harmful gases, and did not focus as such on Alkali manufacturing.
Testimony revolved around three key issues. The first pertained to the scope
of the injury to property and impact on health associated with the gasses.
123 Ashby and Anderson (n 12) 18.
124 See nn 18^20 above and the accompanying text.
125 Hansard HL vol 166 col 1460 (9 May 1862).
126 Ashby and Anderson (n 12) 21.
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The second inquired into available mitigation measures with respect to various
gasses and processes. And the third concerned deficiencies in the regulatory
regime governing noxious vapours under existing legislation and examined
potential alternative regulatory approaches.
On the injury side there were mountains of testimony attesting to the devas-
tation the fumes inflicted on vegetation and the discomforts, even suffering, it
brought to humans, though whether the fumes actually endangered health
could not be resolved. In an effort to establish the inadequacy of existing legis-
lation, numerous witnesses recounted a long list of evidentiary and financial
impediments to successful nuisance indictments. An additional obstacle fol-
lowed from the fact that in order to enter facilities, inspectors required permis-
sion from local judges, undercutting the incentive for industrialists to ensure
that their facilities were taking pertinent pollution prevention measures at all
times. Testimony supported the availability and effectiveness of such measures
across a variety of industries, but nowhere more so than with respect to hydro-
chloric acid emissions from the alkali industry. Because hydrochloric acid was
soluble in water, it was amenable to condensation by allowing it to percolate
through pieces of coke that were subject to a slow stream of water. A device
built on this principle was first patented in1836, and a number of Alkali manu-
facturers made use of it with good results. But others failed to do so in the ab-
sence of sufficient regulatory incentive. But by the time of the Select
Committee hearings, there existed a near consensus, shared not only by scien-
tists, but by the manufacturers as well,‘that it is not only possible, but perfectly
easy, with due care, to carry on the manufacture without causing any percep-
tible injury to the neighbourhood’.127
The Report, which the Select Committee presented in August 1862, offered
two sets of recommendations. The first pointed out desired changes in the
existing legislation with respect to noxious trades, while the second recom-
mended the passage of specific legislation directed at the creation of a specia-
lised law dealing with ‘alkali and other chemical works of a like
description’.128 In this the Committee followed the recommendation of Dr
Lyon Playfair, a respected chemist and sanitarian. Describing soda manufac-
turing (by alkali manufacturers) as ‘the monster nuisance of all’ and noting
the ready availability of control technology, Playfair ventured the opinion that
‘it might be better not to legislate generally for smaller matters when there is
a large subject, like the soda manufacture, which could at once be dealt
with’.129 Perhaps more importantly, as the Committee indicated in its report,
the recommendation for specialised alkali legislation concurred with the view
127 Select Committee on Injury from Noxious Vapours, ‘Injury from Noxious Vapours’ HL (1862)
486 [7].
128 Ibid 9.
129 Select Committee on Injury from Noxious Vapours (n 127) [1137].
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of ‘the manufacturers engaged in those trades, that they ought to be dealt with
by special legislation’.130
Where changes to existing nuisance abatement legislation were concerned,
the Committee noted the great desirability of consolidating and making uni-
form throughout the country the patchwork of nuisance laws existing at the
time.131 Barring that, the Committee recommended a number of measures
geared at strengthening the administrative authority of local nuisance inspect-
ors. Most importantly, these included allowing medical inspectors free access
‘to all works productive of noxious vapours at all hours when such works are
in operation, and that defendants no longer be allowed to decline the jurisdic-
tion of local magistrates and remove cases to the superior courts, and that ap-
peals to superior courts will be restricted to instances where the pertinent
magistrate certifies the existence of questions of law appropriate for such an
appeal’.132 Taken together, these recommendations sought to move nuisance
enforcement closer to the continental administrative model, most importantly
through limits on the oversight functions of regular courts.
With respect to alkali manufacturers, the Committee recommended special
legislation that, without prescribing any specific process, imposed a substantial
penalty on the emission of sulphuric acid and ammonia alum, as well as
hydrochloric gases from alkali works.133 Departing from the local enforcement
processes employed under existing laws, the Committee emphatically recom-
mended that enforcement in this case be made the task of central government
inspectors ‘wholly independent of all local control, and removed, as far as pos-
sible, from all local influence’.134 But the Committee’s most far-reaching recom-
mendation conferred the ability to sue for penalty under the law on ‘any
person’ at quarter sessions, with appeal to superior courts limited to the same
magistrate certification as above.135
The legislation that ultimately passed Parliament as the Alkali Act of 1863
followed the Committee’s recommendation with respect to the focus on alkali
manufacturing and the creation of a centralised inspectorate (but postponed
regulation of sulphuric acid and ammonia alum to a later date).136 Refraining
from specifying the type of control technology to be used, the law imposed an
emission standard requiring that 95% of the hydrochloric acid be removed
from the flues coming out of the stacks of alkali manufacturers.137 The recom-
mendation to allow ‘any person’ to sue for penalties was not endorsed.
Instead, the Government Bill initially placed enforcement directly with the
130 Ibid 9.
131 Ibid 8.
132 Ibid 9.
133 Ashby and Anderson (n 12) 23.
134 Select Committee on Injury from Noxious Vapours (n 127) 9.
135 Ibid 9.
136 Ashby and Anderson (n 12) 23.
137 Ibid 23.
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inspectors. In response to protest from the manufacturers, the final legislation
authorised inspectors to sue for penalties through civil litigation before
county courts subject to unlimited appeals.138 Most importantly, however, the
Act relegated enforcement to a specially created Alkali Inspectorate, under
the direction of the Board of Trade. In this, Parliament concurred not only
with the Committee but with the majority of the alkali manufacturers who fa-
voured special legislation and a centralised inspectorate over subordination to
local authorities.
The Alkali Act passed as a consequence with the tacit or explicit support of
the industry whose interests the law served to a large extent. To begin with,
the law created an even playing field within the industry where, up until
then, plants that had condensed their gases were potentially disadvantaged
relative to competitors that did not. More importantly perhaps, the law appears
to have conferred de facto protection against common law liability, notwith-
standing the explicit retention of common law rights under the Act of 1874.139
In contrast to the common law’s purported absolutist protection against
proven injury, the Alkali Act more modestly aimed at incremental relief
through the implementation of feasible means. AE Fletcher, who served as the
second Chief Inspector of the Alkali Inspectorate, reflected in 1892 in the fol-
lowing words on the novelty inherent to the Act’s approach:
[T]he Alkali Works Regulation Act of 1863, was, as far as I have been able
to discover, a new departure in the legislation not only of this but of any
other country. Prohibition of noxious trades there have been, and, local
Acts to regulate the locality of factories where noxious trades were car-
ried on; but there had been before 1863 noAct of the Legislature whereby
an admission was implied that the emission of noxious gases was in cer-
tain cases unavoidable, and that such would be subject to definite regula-
tions. The Act of 1863 recognised the existence of alkali works, and the
fact that acid gases liable to injure surrounding vegetation were dis-
charged from them. There was not attempt to put a stop to such works
on account of the admitted injury they were liable to inflict on the neigh-
bourhood, but steps were taken to limit that injury, and to oblige the
manufacturers to adopt means for reducing the evil to the smallest pos-
sible amount. I think I am right, therefore in saying that in this Act a
new principle was thus introduced, one differing widely from that of
simple repression, hitherto applied whenever an admitted evil of the
kind was dealt with.140
138 MacLeod (n 10) 85; Ibid.
139 B Pontin, ‘Tort Law and Victorian Government Growth: The Historiographical Significance of
Tort in the Shadow of Chemical Pollution and Factory Safety Regulation’ (1998) 18 OJLS 661,
663.
140 AE Fletcher, ‘Modern Legislation in Restraint of the Emission of Noxious Gases from
Manufacturing Operations’ (1892) 11 J Soc Chem Indus 120.
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The principle to which Fletcher alluded was implicit to the continental licen-
sing regime under which authorisation was often contingent on the deploy-
ment of mitigation measures, not the elimination of injury. The approach was
first introduced into British law under the various earlier-cited legislative pro-
visions allowing the use of best practicable means as a defence against penal-
ties for the creation of nuisances. But since the decision on the meaning of
best practicable means was left to local authorities under those laws, industrial
actors could face multiple and inconsistent control requirements across lo-
cales. This was the problem that centralised inspection was intended to solve,
in similar fashion to the role of the central authorities that oversaw the regula-
tion of industrial processes on the Continent.
The Alkali industry’s consent was what allowed the creation of a centralised
regulatory regime, during an era marked by pronounced anti-centralist senti-
ments of the type that undermined Chadwick’s public health campaigns. The
centralised inspection incorporated into the Alkali Act built on a model
dating to the 1833 Factory Act, which prohibited the employment of children
for more than 12 hours a day, and created a special inspectorate with author-
ity to enter premises and apply legal sanctions. Ambivalence over the propri-
ety of centralised enforcement of this type was evident, however, from the
start, with some of the inspectors adhering to the view that prosecution
was a weapon of last resort and that persuasion, rather than coercion, was
the primary tool of the Inspectorate. Rooted in part in the political need to
secure the cooperation of powerful manufacturers, the conciliatory approach
became the mark of centralised inspection over the course of the 19th cen-
tury.141 For the Alkali industry, the conciliatory reputation of existing central
inspectorates was likely a consideration behind the industry’s preference for
central inspection. If on the Continent the benefits associated with uniform
standards and protection from the potential idiosyncrasies of local regulation
came at the cost of coercive state intervention, the Alkali Act had the potential
of delivering many of the benefits of centralisation in a more industry-friendly
fashion.
The option of adopting the continental licensing model was explicitly advo-
cated by at least two of the witnesses who appeared before the Noxious
Vapours Select Committee. The first was WH Michael, who earlier served as
mayor of the borough and chairman of the Board of Health at Swansea.
Asked whether he had given thought to possible alterations in the existing
law, Mr Michael specifically offered the districting approach ‘adopted in foreign
countries’. Mentioning France and Hamburg as specific examples, Michael rec-
ommended two practices. The first consisted of restricting the location of new
polluting industries ‘to certain places, where damage has been already done’.
141 G Rhodes, Inspectorates in British Government: Law Enforcement and Standards of Efficiency
(Allen and Unwin for the Royal Institute of Public Administration, London 1981) 64.
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The second was a requirement that ‘manufacturers should use the best known
means for preventing injury’.142
In the same vein, though without direct mention of the Continent, a medical
officer and clerk to the Board of Health from London’s Poplar District offered
the licensing requirements governing slaughter houses under the
Metropolitan Market Act of 1857 as a model:
[O]ne of the suggestions which I proposed to offer to the consideration of
your Lordships, that those factories should not be permitted to go on,
unless under license, or something of that sort, as in the case of the
slaughter-houses, the licenses for which are renewable annually; and
the owners give the local authority one month’s notice of their intention
to apply to the petty sessions, so that the local authority may oppose the
application, if they see fit.143
The same witness went on to recommend that licenses be renewed annually,
since it ‘is possible that their plant may be out of order, and from the disorder
of their plant the nuisance may arise’.144 The possibility of emulating the con-
tinental licensing model seemingly received little serious consideration from
the Select Committee, but its report began its discussion of the existing state
of law pertaining to noxious vapours with a reference to the fact that, ‘with
the single exception of the provision in the Public Health Act . . .no previous
sanction is required, as in some other countries, for the establishment of
works likely to produce nuisances’.145 Proposals for Britain to adopt a similar
licensing approach recurred throughout the first decades of the Alkali
Inspectorate, as the following section recounts.
3.2 Regulating in the Shadow of the ‘Preventive System’ of the Continent:
the Alkali Inspectorate under Robert Angus Smith
The distinct regulatory style that would remain true of the Alkali Inspectorate
for over a century was largely the product of the policies pursued under R
Angus Smith, who served as Chief Alkali Inspector from 1864 until his death
in 1884.146 His tenure was marked by continuing debate over the desirability
and legitimacy of continental licensing approaches to pollution regulation.
Smith completed a doctorate in chemistry in Germany, subsequent to which
he served as an assistant to the Health of Towns Commission appointed
142 Select Committee on Injury from Noxious Vapours (n 127) [626].
143 Ibid [2179].
144 Ibid [2183].
145 Ibid 5.
146 MacLeod (n 10) 97,104,109; C Garwood,‘Green Crusaders or Captives of Industry? The British
Alkali Inspectorate and the Ethics of Environmental Decision Making, 1864-95’ (2004) 61
Ann Sci 99.
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in 1843 in response to Chadwick’s Sanitary Reports the year before.
While acting in that capacity, Smith became acquainted with Chadwick
as well as other prominent sanitarians, whom he mentioned favourably in sub-
sequent writings.147 MacLeod described Smith as ‘something of a prote¤ ge¤ of
Chadwick’ but was also careful to note that while ‘Smith knew and admired
Chadwick’ there was little evidence to suggest that he shared Chadwick’s
Benthamite ideology.148 Still, the formative years of Smith’s career put him in
close touch with continental regulatory principles, both because of the time
he himself had spent in Germany, and through his exposure to Chadwick’s
ideas. The degree to which these principles shaped Smith’s regulatory view is
difficult to tell, partially because of the lessons that Chadwick’s failures im-
parted on the hazards of aligning oneself with a continental-inspired reform
agenda. The primary sources shedding light on Smith’s philosophy as Chief
Inspector are the detailed annual reports he submitted to Parliament. In ana-
lysing the discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of licensing across a
number of his reports, it is important to keep in mind that these were for all in-
tents and purposes public relations documents, and that Smith must have
been aware of the imperative of framing his message in politically palatable
ways.
Smith first broached the topic of licensing in his third report, covering the
Inspectorate’s activities in 1866. In what would be his strongest statement in
support of licensing Smith noted in that report that both the public and indus-
try stood to benefit from a requirement for pre-authorisation:
If it were generally demanded that no factory should be put up on any
spot, with certain exceptions or within certain limits, without the sanc-
tion of the constituted authorities, which may be those of the district,
the public would find fuller protection provided in such cases; when per-
mission was given, the authorities could not assist anyone to object to
the works if they were conducted according to the standard of purity.149
Smith’s report the following year was clear on the extent to which the option of
adopting a continental licensing approach continued to excite debate. Notably,
in contrast to his seeming endorsement of licensing the year before, this time
around Smith adopted a more neutral stance:
As considerable interest has been excited regarding the mode of dealing
with chemical works, and French, Belgian, and German law blamed and
eulogized, without sufficient reason, I think it will be well to give here
147 A Gibson andWV Farrar, ‘Angus Smith, FRS and ‘Sanitary Science’’(1974) 28 Notes Rec R Soc
241, 242; JM Eyler, ‘Conversion of Angus Smith: The Changing role of Chemistry and Biology
in Sanitary Science, 1850-1880’ (1980) 54 B Hist Med 216, 217.
148 MacLeod (n 10) 91.
149 Inspector of Alkali Works,1866 Third Annual Report (London 1867) 53.
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some of the points which seem to be most interesting to us. There is
something both to learn and to avoid.150
Having thus distanced himself from the position of either side in this
debate, Smith devoted the following 26 of the 115 pages in the main body
of his report to detailed discussion of the regulation of noxious trades
in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, much of it drawn, or directly
quoted, from the earlier discussed treatise by Jules Vilain. He added some
observations based on his own travels to the Continent, and concluded with
a statement suggesting that the continental approach failed to produce the
expected result: ‘[m]y belief is that, comparing the attempts to legislate
with the result, there has been in all cases a failure of the most decided
kind. The so-called preventive system has failed. A work may be permitted
to begin because within the law, but it extends and infringes laws. Must it
be taken to a new place on such extension? To do so would frequently cause
bankruptcy. This is one important reason why the preventive system has
failed’.151
It would appear from the above that Smith has changed his mind regarding
the benefits of licensing which he seemed to endorse in his report the previous
year. Yet we find him making the following licence-like proposal in his Ninth
Annual Report:
I cannot avoid thinking that some relief will be found in the suggestion
made some time ago to have the air examined when new manufactories
are proposed, and if the atmosphere is injured to a certain extent, to
allow no more of the same manufactories at the place. This will give a
maximum limit of bad air. Improved methods will allow a place to in-
crease, but not inferior methods.152
He repeated the argument in a speech he delivered in 1876, where he said:
I am inclined to say that it might fairly be laid down that no chemical
works, giving out any of the acids mentioned, should be built, unless a
certain much higher degree of purity than is attained now were ob-
tained; and for muriatic acid I may say that I am so fully satisfied with
late results in certain quarters, that I should put the maximum at a very
low figure . . .When new works were put under this pressure, old ones
would follow in time.153
150 Ibid,1867 Fourth Annual Report (London 1868) 89.
151 Ibid 115.
152 Inspector of Alkali Works,1872 Ninth Annual Report (London 1873) 35.
153 R Angus Smith,‘What Amendments Are Required in the Legislation Necessary to Prevent the
Evils Arising from Noxious Vapours and Smoke?’ [1877] Transactions of the National
Association for the Promotion of Social Science 495, 532.
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Yet in testimony he gave that very year before the Royal Commission on
Noxious Vapours (discussed below), he rejected the idea of creating industrial
districts of the type found in Belgium and Germany and described the concept
as ‘rather different to our usual ideas of things in England’.154
The discrepancy between the latter two statements might be explained
through the distinction between districting (designed to concentrate polluting
industries in designated locales), and licensing (geared at the implementation
of improved control technology). The same cannot be said of Smith’s seeming
fluctuations vis-a' -vis the benefits of the Continental ‘preventive system’ as
such.What is quite clear, however, is the salience of the continental alternative
to the regulatory discourse of Smith’s time in the Inspectorate. In interpreting
Smith’s inconsistencies and ambiguity regarding the preventive approach, it is
likewise important to keep in mind the political constraints inherent in the
Alkali Inspectorate’s subordination to the Board of Trade, and, from 1872, the
Local Government Board. John Lambert, who headed the Local Government
Board, was sceptical of centralised enforcement and favoured strengthening
the authority of local government institutions, in keeping with the sentiments
of the anti-centralisation movement. John Simon shared this perspective, and
both men testified to this effect before the Royal Commission on Noxious
Vapours.155 Implementing a licensing regime under the auspices of the Alkali
Inspectorate would have entailed increased centralisation and, as such, Smith
had good reason to suspect that the prospect cut against the wishes of his su-
periors in the Local Government Board. It is perhaps relevant in this connec-
tion that Smith encountered difficulties when he sought to procure funding
from the Local Government Board for travel to Holland and France for the pur-
pose of observing chemical works there. Though Smith eventually received
some funding for his travel, the request was initially declined and partially
granted only after Smith submitted a letter detailing the benefits he expected
from this type of comparative investigation.156
The Royal Commission on Noxious Vapours was convened in 1876 in re-
sponse to growing public concern with industrial pollution and mounting pol-
itical pressures for more stringent regulatory controls. The Committee heard
from 197 witnesses over a period of almost two years and published its report
in 1878. The option of adopting the continental licensing approach was
among the alternatives put before the Committee for consideration. Notably, it
was a chemical manure manufacturer who was among the most enthusiastic
supporters of the licensing approach. His testimony built in this respect on
his experience establishing a facility in Germany (together with a German
154 The Royal Commission on Noxious Vapours, ‘Report of the Royal Commission on Noxious
Vapours Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty’ (C (2nd series)
2159) 1878 [313].
155 Ibid.
156 MacLeod (n 10) 104.
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partner) and the contrast between that experience and the situation he faced
in England where 20 years after establishing his works he was now facing
pressures to move as the surrounding community became increasingly intoler-
ant of the smell. This type of eventuality, he implied, was precluded in
Germany where the building of works was conditioned on the government’s
approval. For this reason he believed ‘that if some kind of plan like that could
be pursued with regard to the erection of works in England it would be more
satisfactory than that we should be allowed to put works up and be allowed
to exist for 20 years, and then be told that we must not use them any longer,
or do something which I say is impossible’.157
The Royal Commission made reference in its report to a suggestion put
before it that ‘a veto might be given to a government department, such as the
Local Government Board, on the erection of new chemical works in districts
where such works do not at present exist, or more generally on the erection of
any new chemical works whatever’.158 But, gesturing towards the anti-
centralists, it rejected the proposal under the argument that ‘the exercise of
such a veto scarcely seems to us a legitimate function of government’.159 As
the Report made evident, the very legitimacy of legislative interference in busi-
ness and attendant inspection remained contested at the time. In this connec-
tion it quoted the testimony of Hussey Vivian, a member of Parliament and
the owner of a large copper smelter in Swansea, that as an Englishman, he ob-
jected to ‘inspection of any kind . . . to the greatest degree’.160 Vivian’s objection,
as the Report explained, was based in a deeply rooted, but still resonant,
common law principles: ‘Mr. Vivian argues, and he is far from being alone in
his views, that the law of the land should provide adequate remedies for all
injuries and nuisances, and that aggrieved individuals should be left to vindi-
cate their rights and seek compensation for their wrongs in the courts of
law’.161 However, in the final analysis, as the Report pointed out, the great ma-
jority of the witnesses, including the Alkali manufacturers, supported the con-
tinuation of centralised inspection.
3.3 Best Practicable Means
Next to licensing, the most ambitious reform proposal put before the Royal
Commission came from FA Fletcher, the man who would in time replace
Smith as Chief Inspector. Fletcher called for a general Act requiring the
157 The Royal Commission on Noxious Vapours (n 154) [9242].
158 Ibid 33.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid 27.
161 Ibid.
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employment of the ‘best practicable means’ (BPM) for the prevention or mitiga-
tion of all noxious vapours.162 The proposal built on the language of an 1874
Amendment to the original Alkali Act. Under that Act, the Alkali
Inspectorate’s jurisdiction extended beyond hydrochloric acid to all noxious
gases emitted byAlkali works. But whereas hydrochloric acid was subject to a
numeric standard (to which the 1874 Act added a new one), it was felt that
available information precluded the setting of similarly exact standards where
other alkali gases were concerned. As a consequence, in lieu of specifying an
emission standard, the 1874 Act required owners of alkali works to ‘use the
best practicable means of preventing the discharge into the atmosphere’of nox-
ious gases, other than hydrochloric acid.163
Under the Nuisances Removal Act, as well as other similar legislation, BPM
functioned as a defence against nuisance prosecutions through the granting
of a de facto exemption from nuisance liability to those who deployed such
means.164 This approach allowed for indirect enforcement of technology-based
standards. This was the model followed under the Rivers (Pollution
Prevention) Act of 1876 which coupled a prohibition on pollution by solid
matter with a defence allowing escape from liability where the ‘best practicable
and available means’ to make the deposit harmless have been taken.165 The
1874 Alkali Act Amendment deviated from this model in that it defined the en-
forcement authority of the Inspectorate in reference to the ‘best practicable
means standard’, which functioned in this fashion as a positive regulatory
mandate. Smith viewed this strategy as a temporary measure made necessary
by the difficulty of setting more precise standards.166 He viewed exact numeric-
al standards, of the type applicable to hydrochloric acid, as superior to the
162 Ibid 33.
163 The Alkali Act 1874 (37 & 38 Vict c 43).
164 Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Act 1855 s XXVIL (18 & 19 Vict c 121).
165 Continental regulatory practices regarding water pollution were explicitly consulted in the
process leading to the Rivers (Pollution Prevention) Act. On October 21, 1868 the Secretary
to the Commission appointed to study the problem of river pollution, S J Smith, issued the fol-
lowing request:
[H]aving been informed that the Prussian Government exercises strict supervision over
manufactories, in order to prevent as far as possible the pollution of rivers, I am directed
to request that application may be made to them for a copy of the enactments in force
in Prussia for that purpose . . . It is most desirable that the Commissioners should be in
possession of the enactments and regulations in force in other countries in order that
they may be enabled to meet objections which may be made to interference on the part
of the government of this country, with the different branches of trade and manufacture
that now so seriously pollute the rivers.
(Royal Commission on River Pollution, ‘Report of the Royal Commission on River Pollution’
(1870) vol II 283.) The Commission’s Report reproduced the laws pertaining to river pollution
in Prussia, France and other continental countries.
166 Ashby and Anderson (n 12) 40.
Is Precautionary Regulation a Civil Law Instrument? 37
 at M
ichigan State U
niversity on A
ugust 13, 2012
http://jel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
vague mandates inherent to the BPM formula. Fletcher, in contrast, valued the
inherent flexibility of the BPM approach, over statutory enumeration of emis-
sion standards. Responding to the argument of some of those who expressed
fear before the Noxious Vapours Commission that the BPM standard ‘is not suf-
ficiently definite and binding on the manufacturer’ Fletcher expressed the
view that BPM would in fact ‘be more binding than a definite figure, even if
that could be given, for it is an elastic band, and may be kept always tight as
knowledge of the methods of suppressing the evils complained of increases’.167
The primary benefit that BPM offered over statutory emission standards was
that it bypassed the need for Parliament to step in with a statutory amendment
whenever improvements in pollution control technology justified tightening
the standards. The emission standard that the Alkali Act of 1863 set remained
unaltered until the passage of the Alkali Act Amendments of 1874, 11 years
later. By that time the original standard was seriously out of date, but the
Alkali Inspectorate lacked the jurisdiction to tighten the standard on its
own.168 Speaking to this issue, Smith suggested in a speech he delivered in
1876 that the solution might lie in allowing the Local Government Board to
issue an order, subject to retroactive sanctioning by Parliament, changing the
applicable limits as necessary.
Smith was referring in this connection to what was then a novel practice
under which, in order to increase the speed and efficiency of administrative
action, Parliament authorised executive agencies to issue orders modifying
existing legislation when found necessary (with the requirement that these
changes be subsequently given parliamentary approval). By the start of the
20th century, this practice would be at the center of a bitter political contro-
versy, with opponents terming the pertinent legislation ‘Henry VIII clauses’
after the 1539 ‘Statute of Proclamations’ which Parliament passed during
Henry VIII’s reign.169 The 1539 Act aimed to legitimate the controversial prac-
tice of royal proclamations by conferring upon it explicit parliamentary author-
isation.170 Those who invoked the phrase ‘Henry VIII clauses’ at the start of
the 20th century sought to analogise executive lawmaking of their days to
Tudor and Stewart absolutism.171 The constitutional question on the table was
the same one Fortescue put forth when he argued for the absence of preroga-
tive lawmaking authority under common law.172
167 The Royal Commission on Noxious Vapours (n 154) [6590].
168 Smith (n 153) 532.
169 çç,‘Departmental Legislation’ Times of London (London 16 February 1929) 13.
170 Statute of Proclamations 1539 (31 Hen 8 c 8).
171 Rt Hon Lord Hewart,The New Despotism (Ernest Benn, London 1929).
172 N Morag-Levine, ‘Agency Statutory Interpretation and the Rule of Common Law’ (2009) 2009
Mich St L Rev 51.
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The controversy was still in its infancy during Smith’s time, but already suf-
ficiently present to lead Smith to choose his words with caution:
It shows that the same powers ought to be proceeded with, but with
somewhat more speed. There were eleven years between the first and
second Alkali Acts, a most unnecessary time. This suggested to me the
propriety of having the strictness of the tests increased by a more rapid
method than an Act of Parliament. This might be done by an order of
the Government, for example, of the Local Government Board, with the
sanction of Parliament, a method not without precedent, as I under-
stand, and less liable to cause delays, than when the usual course of a
Bill is to be run.173
The great benefit inherent to the BPM formula was its ability to allow for flexi-
bility and timely change in applicable standards. A law such as the one
Fletcher advocated would have conferred on the Inspectorate almost complete
discretion to regulate all sources of noxious gases and to adjust this regulation
as circumstances changed, with little if any need to return to Parliament.
The majority of manufacturers supported the concept,174 a fact suggestive of
their trust that the Inspectorate would not turn BPM into an overly harsh
regulatory instrument. But the Noxious Vapours Commission was reluctant to
recommend such a revolutionary step, and instead opted for a number of incre-
mental measures, including ones that would set the stage for the future ascen-
dance of BPM in British regulation.
The recommendations of the Royal Commission were by and large reflected
in the Alkali Etc. Amendment Act (1881).175 The Act, for the first time, extended
the Alkali Act’s jurisdiction beyond Alkali works to a closed list of scheduled in-
dustrial processes including the manufacturers of sulphuric acid, chemical
manure, nitric acid, sulphate and muriate of ammonia, chlorine salt and
cement. The standard applied to these processes was BPM, since the state of
knowledge regarding pertinent pollution control capabilities was deemed in-
sufficient to support numeric standards.176 The Act deviated from Fletcher’s
original proposal in that it listed the works to be subject to BPM, rather than
conferring on the Inspectorate blanket authority to subject all polluting indus-
tries to BPM. This left in place the need for Parliament to revise the list of
scheduled industries through legislation. Fletcher alluded to this problem in
an article he published in 1888: ‘[s]carcely is the ink dry with which such a
list is written than works are established or processes are added to those
173 Smith (n 153) 532.
174 Ashby and Anderson (n 12) 41.
175 Alkali &c Amendment Act 1881 (44 & 45 Vict c 37).
176 Macleod (n 10) 108.
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already existing, which had they been known sooner, would certainly have
been included’.177 Nonetheless, the same article declared ‘[t]he Act of 1881 is
thus a great advance on those of 1863 and 1874, especially in that the principle
is introduced of throwing on the manufacturer an obligation to employ the
best known methods for preventing the escape of noxious gas, or otherwise
avoiding a nuisance’.178
Written by one of the Inspectors for the Alkali Inspectorate, the article went
on to offer a first-hand account of the benefits associated with BPM:
[T]he phrase not only goes beyond and is independent of definite fixed
standards- it also constructs them. If it can be shown, after prolonged ob-
servation, that in conducting some process of manufacture a certain
amount of success in controlling noxious emanations is usually achieved,
this result becomes a basis for the future, a standard to which all are ex-
pected to conform: and this standard has the great advantage over one ri-
gidly fixed by Act of Parliament, that it is one which accommodates
itself to the varying conditions of manufacture and the changing light
which knowledge brings to bear on it. In that the Act of 1881 embodies
this principle, and enjoins in conducting certain manufacturing pro-
cesses that the best practicable means shall be used for preventing the
discharge into the atmosphere of all noxious gases evolved in such work,
it makes a great advance over the past legislation on this subject.179
Fletcher, who became Chief Inspector after Smith’s death in 1884, continued in
the capacity to press for the passage of a general noxious vapours Act, that
would eliminate the need to add new processes by legislation, but was unsuc-
cessful in his effort.180 Thirteen scheduled works were added to the list of regu-
lated industries when the Alkali Act was again revised in 1892. And in 1906
(by then under a new Chief Inspector) the Act was further expanded and con-
solidated into the mold that would remain in force (subject to periodic updating
of the list of scheduled sources) up until the 1980s.181
The 1906 Act included, for the first time, a statutory description of ‘best
practicable means’ which included, beyond the design of furnaces and other
equipment, proper maintenance of applicable technology and supervision of
all processes responsible for emitting noxious gasses within a facility.182 In ac-
tuality, however, the meaning of the BPM concept was to be found in the un-
written laws at the core of a regulatory tradition dating to the earliest days of
177 A Fletcher,‘The Present State of the Law Concerning the Pollution of Air andWater’ (1888) 36
J Soc Arts 567, 574.
178 Ibid 573.
179 Ibid 574.
180 Ashby and Anderson (n 12) 69^70.
181 Alkali, &cWorks Regulation Acts 1906 (6 Edw 7 c14). By 1979 2884 processes were under the
jurisdiction of the Alkali Act. Hill (n 8) 166.
182 Alkali, &c Works Regulation Act 1906 s 27(6 Edw 7 c14).
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the Inspectorate. Speaking to Parliament not long after the Alkali Act first
came into effect, Lord Derby expressed his profound satisfaction at the way
things were proceeding under the Inspectorate: ‘I am sure I only express a uni-
versal opinion when I say that the Board of Trade could not have made a
better appointment than that of Dr Angus Smith, whose scientific knowledge
is universally known, and who has conducted the proceedings under the Act
in so conciliatory a spirit as to have tended materially to the success of the
Act’.183 With the recent precedent of Edwin Chadwick in mind, Angus Smith
committed to a collaborative model of governance. The enthusiastic endorse-
ment of a Conservative leader of Lord Derby’s stature attests to his success in
this regard.184
The impact of the anti-centralisation movement, and its underlying
common law sensibilities, is likewise reflected in the manner in which the
BPM standard accommodated variation in local economic and geographical
circumstances. Smith addressed this issue in his annual report on the
Inspectorate’s activities in 1871 in the context of the difficulties inherent in
the absence of a clear-cut definition for a nuisance and the attendant conflict
surrounding it. It would be, he argued, ‘very desirable to enable us to say dis-
tinctly: this is allowed and no more’.185 At the same time, he made a point of
emphasising that any such standard must allow for variation in reference to
the conditions of diverse locales: ‘[i]t would be very unfair to make a general
law fixing the meaning of a nuisance to be the same in all conditions. Why
should a manufacturer established in a desert part of the county be treated
like one in a crowded thoroughfare? Or when no one complains, or, rather,
when no one is hurt, why should the mere formality of keeping a law be
observed?’186
Of the various factors Smith outlined as potentially relevant to the appropri-
ate severity of regulatory standards, it is his reference to the absence of com-
plaints as reason for more lax standards that is particularly instructive. As
Jules Vilain wrote in 1857, the distinction between reactive and preventive
regulation marked the dividing line between the English and continental
183 Hansard HL vol 179 cols 631^36 (22 May 1865).
184 Amplifying his earlier statement, Lord Derby went on to note:
I would be the last man to ask the Government to undertake, or to venture myself upon a
Quixotic attack upon the various processes of those manufactures which form the
staple of the wealth of this country, and with which my own interests are closely con-
nected; but I hope the successful results of this experiment will have the effect of allay-
ing any jealously or apprehensions which may be felt by manufacturers in kindred
branches of trade, and to encourage the Government to proceed cautiously, but steadily,
with the object of introducing measures for the purpose of removing many nuisances
which at present unnecessarily accompany many of our manufacturing processes.
(Ibid 635).
185 Inspector of Alkali Works,1871Eighth Annual Report (London 1872) 5.
186 Ibid.
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approaches. It was because, in England, pollution control was contingent on
local political and legal mobilisation that, at least by some accounts, English
industrialists could bypass pollution controls by locating among poorer popu-
lations that lacked the resources to bring about effective intervention. In tying
its enforcement decisions to local complaints, the Alkali Inspectorate retained
elements of this reactive tradition.
The Alkali Act gave rise in this fashion to a hybrid regulatory approach
which melded preventive implementation of technology standards with
case-by-case decision making in the style of the common law. The emergence
of this distinctly British approach simultaneously speaks both to the weakness
and the strength of common law principles in 19th century British regulatory
politics. The evident incapacity of reactive common law institutions to ad-
equately respond to problems of industrial pollution exerted powerful pres-
sures for Britain to adopt a preventive regime similar to the continental
approach. At the same time, the ability of opponents to appeal to deep-seated
antagonism towards continental law across centuries of British constitutional
history, made it politically difficult, if not impossible, for reformers to directly
transplant continental regulatory institutions into Britain, as Chadwick’s ex-
perience perhaps best illustrates. The result was a synthetic adaptation of pre-
ventive, technology-based, continental regulation to common law sensibilities
under a uniquely British BPM approach.
4. Conclusion
Writing in 1981 against emergent tensions between Britain and continental
Europe over environmental policy, Ashby and Anderson wrote in the conclu-
sion of a book largely devoted to the history of the Alkali Act:
The Alkali Act is administered in a way that tries to reconcile the often
conflicting interest of the public who want clean air, the manufacturer
who wants to make a profit, the employees who want to keep their jobs
and to get a good wage, and the government who wants national prosper-
ity. Such a remit as this is incompatible with the imposition of inflexible
fixed emission standards; it requires a separate value judgment for each
set of circumstances.187
Elsewhere in the same book they more explicitly tackled the comparison with
the Continent: ‘[p]rogress by ‘Minute Particulars’: this has been a characteristic
of the evolution of policy for the control of pollution in Britain . . . in our view
187 Ashby and Anderson (n 12) 136.
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it is one reason why this policy^compared with the policies of some other
countries^has proved workable’.188
Differences between the British and continental approaches have lost much
of their salience since the 1980s through a series of mutual adjustments be-
tween EU and British regulatory instruments.189 In the process, long-standing
paradigms of the British approach to regulation have been fundamentally
transformed.190 In turn, Britain was able to shape elements of the EU’s environ-
mental regime in accordance with its traditional approach. Especially import-
ant in this connection, as Andrew Jordan has noted, is the IPPC Directive’s
attention to local conditions in the setting of BAT standards.191
Irrespective of the ultimate impact of the EU on the resilience of the British
approach to regulation, an appreciation of the common law’s historical role in
the forging of that approach is of significant contemporary relevance. First
and foremost, this is because of the ability of the British story to shed light on
the common law’s continuing impact on American environmental policy and
contemporary divisions over the precautionary principle. Both in the context
of American-British and British-continental comparisons, the centrality of the
BPM concept within the British approach has obscured the common law’s ex-
planatory power. In the first instance, the 19th-century emergence in
Britainçbut not in the United Statesçof a centralised, technology-linked,
regulatory regime highlighted differences, rather than similarities between
these two common law countries. At the same time, underlying similarities be-
tween BPM and continental technology standards likewise argued against the
characterisation of technology standards as a civil law instrument. Implicit to
both sets of arguments, however, is the understanding of the Alkali Act itself
as an indigenously British development, rather than a law modelled on contin-
ental examples. In contrast, if the Alkali Act was itself the product of continen-
tal influences, it becomes easier to reconcile the long-standing presence of
precautionary technology standards in Britain with the civil law characterisa-
tion of such standards. This in turn, should prompt greater attention to the in-
fluence of legal traditions in studies of national legal styles and comparative
environmental politics more generally.
188 Ibid 70.
189 Ball and Bell (n 5) 107.
190 A Jordan, The Europeanization of British Environmental Policy: A Department Perspective
(Palgrave Macmillan, NewYork 2002) 189.
191 Council Directive (EC) 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
January 2008 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control [2008] OJ L24/8.
Jordan describes the IPPC Directive as ‘a curious hybrid of British and German approaches’
and cites the fact that the IPPC ‘explicitly mentions that local conditions must be taken into
account in determining BAT’ in support of the argument that ‘[i]n many important respects,
the IPPC Directive does not disrupt Britain’s basic paradigm underpinning industrial air pol-
lution control’ (ibid 165).
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